Currency Crises and Collapses by Rudger Dornbusch et al.
RUDIGER  DORNBUSCH 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
ILAN  GOLDFAJN 
Brandeis University 
RODRIGO  0.  VALDES 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
Currency  Crises and Collapses 
It is not speed  that kills,  it is the sudden stop. 
Bankers' adage 
THE  COLLAPSE of the Mexican peso in late 1994 remains a topic of 
controversy.  To some observers  it appeared  that  the bungling  of a new 
administration  had  brought  about  a disaster  where  there  was no problem 
and every reason to expect stability and prosperity.  In fact, some even 
argue  that the damage  could be undone  by raising  the peso to its initial 
level. The notion  that  the devaluation  was a blunder  or worse  was shared 
by the Wall  Street  Journal's editorial  board,  some members  of the U.S. 
Congress,  and  other  advocates  of hard  money, including  exposed inves- 
tors. In the Financial Times Jude Wanniski  referred  to "currency  de- 
valuationists," and "currency  debauchery"  at the hands  of Lawrence 
Summers  and Stanley Fischer.  ' 
To others, the ultimate  collapse seemed inevitable  and  the only issue 
was one of timing. In this view currency  alignment-devaluation or 
floating-was  long overdue  and  had  it been accomplished  earlier,  much 
We are indebted  to our discussants  on the Brookings  Panel, and to Stanley Fischer 
and Robert  Barro,  for helpful comments  and suggestions. 
1. On raising  the peso, see David Malpass, "The Mexican  Peso: 3.5 or Bust," Wall 
Street  Journal, January  11, 1995, p. A14. On the view that the devaluation  was mis- 
guided, see Robert  L. Bartley, "Mexico: Suffering  the Conventional  Wisdom," Wall 
Street Journal, February  8,  1995, p. A14; Paul A. Gigot, "Potomac Watch: Piniata 
Politics, or Who Lost Mexico?" Wall  Street  Journal, February  24,  1995, p. A10; and 
Jude Wanninski, "At Odds with the Economic 'Scientists'," Financial Times, April 
11,  1995. 
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of the damage  could have been avoided. The protracted  lack of growth, 
other than for election year spending, was the prime evidence of un- 
sustainable  overvaluation.2 
To virtually  any observer, the sheer vehemence of the collapse and 
the extent  of disruption  in capital  markets  remain  a surprise.3  This paper 
revisits the peso question by looking at several instances of currency 
collapse and identifying their common features, in particular,  the way 
in which vulnerabilities  interacted  and cumulated.  The paper  suggests 
that a situation  of overvaluation  is deeply unstable  because, in a dere- 
gulated financial  environment,  it creates mechanisms  that amplify the 
excesses and exacerbate  the subsequent  financial  distress and decline 
in real activity. This is illustrated  by the examples of Mexico in 1982 
and 1994, Chile in the early 1980s, and Finland  in 1992. The Chilean 
situation  was so much a dry run of what happened  in Mexico in 1994 
that  it is difficult  to understand  why policymakers  and  financial  markets 
refused  to accept the relevance  of the precedent  and its implications.  If 
anything, the sustainability of  such policies was more plausible in 
Chile, where  there  was initially a boom, than  in Mexico, which did not 
experience growth. The paper  also looks at collapses within the Euro- 
pean Monetary  System (EMS) by way of comparison. 
The paper  emphasizes four points. First, that the real exchange rate 
is a key relative price. When it becomes too high it hurts growth, 
endangers  financial  stability, and  ultimately  comes crashing  down. Sec- 
ond, that the real exchange rate is in many, though  not all, instances  a 
policy variable;  this represents  a departure  from  a large  body of thought. 
Third, that an overly accommodating  capital market aggravates  the 
potential  for mismanaging  the exchange rate  and amplifies  the ultimate 
costs of a collapse. Disagreement  about the exchange rate at is a key 
aspect  of why policymakers  and  capital  markets  produce  an overvalued 
rate. Fourth,  that inflation  has been overemphasized  as a policy target. 
Given the great difficulty in bringing  down inflation  fully without  pro- 
tracted  recession, a regime of moderate  but relatively stable  inflation  is 
an acceptable, if imperfect, interim  solution. 
The paper  emphasizes the inertia  of the level and rate of change of 
2.  See Dornbusch  and Werner  (1994). 
3.  For alternative  views on the Mexican  collapse, see Calvo and Mendoza  (1995), 
Atkeson and Rfos-Rull (1995); Leiderman  and Thorne (1995); Sachs, Tornell, and 
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prices as a key aspect of real exchange rate  behavior. Because the real 
exchange rate is sticky downward,  policymakers  are ill-advised to let 
it rise in the first place. At the outset of any stabilization,  the nominal 
exchange  rate should play a key role, more so if an economy is coming 
out of extreme inflation.4  But soon that strategy must give way to a 
more flexible rate regime that does not risk cumulative  overvaluation. 
Going beyond autopsy, the paper  looks at the situations  in Brazil and 
Argentina  to consider whether  a somewhat  overvalued  currency  can be 
brought  down without  crisis and, in particular,  whether  and how nom- 
inal devaluation  can be effective. The paper  also compares  the growth 
performance  of Chile and Mexico. It concludes that Mexico's neglect 
of a competitive  real  exchange  rate  is an important  factor  in its relatively 
poorer  performance. 
Four Similar Crises 
This section reviews four currency collapses that share common 
features:  an overvaluation;  large external  deficits;  lending  up to the last 
minute; and a deep recession in the aftermath,  amplified by serious 
problems  in the financial  system. The aim of the comparison  is to draw 
out common  factors  that  sustain  a protracted  overvaluation  and  that  lead 
to the ultimate  collapse. 
The central  contention  of this section is that in trying to fight infla- 
tion, the authorities  rely on a nominal  exchange  rate  anchor.  This does, 
in fact, help to contain  inflation,  but  it does so at the cost of a cumulative 
real appreciation. The real appreciation  hurts growth and leads to a 
buildup of a large external deficit. The financial sector is drawn into 
the process because interest rates in local currency  rise to reflect the 
diminishing  public confidence  in the viability of the policy. Borrowing 
abroad  to lend at home, or just to fund firms, becomes common. 
Over time the situation becomes unsustainable,  but that does not 
translate  into an immediate  crisis or a need to take action instantly.  On 
the contrary,  it is diffuse enough  for policymakers  to entertain  the belief 
that the strategy can work, and for skeptics to believe that it will 
4.  See the discussion in Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1993). For  discussions  of exchange 
rate-based  stabilizations,  see Calvo and Vegh (1994), Bruno  and others  (1988), Kiguel 
and  Liviatan  (1992), Rebelo and Vegh (1995), and Edwards  (1993). 222  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
ultimately  fail, although  possibly not for several years. The belief that 
it may take years for a problem  to become acute removes the urgency 
for both financial  markets  and policymakers. 
The overvaluation  situation is sufficiently diffuse for different  par- 
ticipants  to entertain  very different  views as to the timing  and  modalities 
of its solution. One scenario is that the currency  peg holds, and good 
news comes to offer relief and draw  attention  away from (and  prospec- 
tively resolve) trade and growth problems-the  North American  Free 
Trade  Agreement, in the case of Mexico. But sometimes other devel- 
opments  make it increasingly  difficult to wait for good news. Instead, 
the arrival  of bad news (in the form of the international  environment  or 
politics, for example) forces a collapse, and is then routinely faulted 
for  the  failure  of  the  strategy:  "If  it  had not  been  for  .  .  .  ."  This 
scenario  is absurd  since, in the words  of Herbert  Stein, anything  that  is 
unsustainable  will ultimately end. Only an unending string of good 
news would avoid the eventual  abandonment  or collapse of the strategy. 
An exchange rate strategy  that is only viable with good news is a bad 
strategy. 
Another  possibility is a game of reputation  in which the firmness  of 
the authorities  increasingly gains credibility and translates  into rapid 
disinflation, even deflation, to the point where competitiveness over 
time is restored. 
The exact details of the story of overvaluation  and crisis differ from 
episode to episode, but the broad  pattern  is very much  the same. A few 
cases follow, to draw attention  to the parallels.5 
Chile,  1978-82 
Following the coup of 1973, Chile's military  government  introduced 
many of the reforms now called the Washington  consensus: opening 
trade, balancing the budget, privatization, and of course, stabilizing 
the high inflation.6 By  1978 much of the work had been done, and 
5.  Such parallels  rarely  convince policymakers  who are locked into their  own cred- 
ibility strategies.  Mexican  policymakers  were perfectly  well aware  of the case of Chile, 
but that  did not stop them from replicating  the situation. 
6.  See Edwards  and Edwards (1987) for a comprehensive  study of the Chilean 
experience, and also the essays in Bosworth,  Dornbusch,  and Laban  (1994) and Dorn- 
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Euromoney  referred  to the economic change as "spectacular.  "7 But it 
was not complete without  full success on the issue of disinflation. 
In June 1979, after a year and a half of the tablita exchange rate 
policy, the government  addressed  the inflation  issue with an even more 
determined  program  of exchange rate  pegging. Appealing  to the law of 
one price, it contended that inflation was kept alive by a cycle  of 
depreciation  and inflation  that, in turn, was validated  by another  round 
of depreciation.  Cutting  through  that  cycle required  an end of deprecia- 
tion. Following this logic, the exchange rate was fixed at 39 pesos to 
the U.S.  dollar and kept at that level for three years, even though the 
rate of inflation  was initially above 30 percent. 
Over time inflation declined. Yet the fixed exchange rate and rela- 
tively moderate  world inflation meant a steady real appreciation.  The 
opening of trade, combined with the real appreciation,  caused a large 
deterioration  in the trade  balance. By 1981 the trade  deficit  had  reached 
8.2 percent  of GDP, and the current  account  deficit stood at 14.5 per- 
cent. These deficits were easily financed.  This was the period  when oil 
exporters' surpluses  were being recycled; thus Chile not only made a 
comeback  in the world capital market  following the Allende years, but 
also found ready access to steady financing  for large and growing ex- 
ternal  deficits. Table 1 provides information  on some of Chile's prin- 
cipal macroeconomic  indicators. 
We focus on the exchange rate policy from June 1978 to June 1982. 
The real exchange rate in August 1981 was 59.5  percent above its 
average over the period 1970-80,  as shown in figure 1 (higher index 
value  is appreciation).8 Relative  to those of the United  States, wholesale 
prices increased  by 21 percent  between  the first  quarter  of 1978 and  the 
crash  of the exchange rate regime in 1982, even though  the wholesale 
price index (WPI) had already  fallen during 1981. 
The Chilean economic picture was very diffuse. In the late 1970s, 
most people's view was colored by the very positive developments  that 
had taken place.9 The impression of an economic miracle was not so 
farfetched  because, against  the background  of chaos and  hyperinflation 
7.  "Chile: The Move to Market  Economy," Euromoney,  July 1978. 
8.  Using the J. P.  Morgan effective exchange rate based on nonfood wholesale 
prices, in which an increase  in the index represents  exchange  rate  appreciation. 
9.  See, for example, "The Fight Goes On: Survey  of Chile," Economist,  February 
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Table  1. Chile: Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1978-82 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
GDP  growtha  8.2  8.3  7.8  5.5  -14.1 
Inflation  (CPI)b  30.3  38.9  31.2  9.5  20.7 
Inflation  (WPI)c  43.2  56.3  31.9  -4.8  37.5 
Depreciationd  47.0  17.6  4.7  0.0  30.5 
Current  accounte  - 1.1  -1.2  - 2.0  -4.7  - 2.3 
Real  exchange  rate'  112.9  126.0  154.0  176.2  158.6 
Real interest  rateg  35.7  6.7  15.8  59.2  24.8 
Terms  of trade  122  141  128  111  102 
Debte  7.4  9.4  12.1  15.7  17.3 
Source: Data for growth, CPI inflation, depreciation, and the real interest rate are from Intertiatioial Financial Statistics; 
for WPI inflation, the current account balance, and debt, from Banco Central de Chile ( 1989); and for terms of trade, from 
the World Bank's Wo-ld Taibles. Data for the real exchange rate are obtained directly from the J. P. Morgan  currency index 
database. 
a. Percent per year. 
b. December-to-December percentage change in CPI. 
c.  December-to-December percentage change in wholesale prices of national goods. 
d. December-to-December percentage change in national currency divided by U.S.  dollars. 
e.  Billions of U.S.  dollars. 
f. Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices,  1990 =  100. 
g. Lending rate less WPI inflation. 
in the early 1970s, Chile had accomplished  the transition  to a serious 
public  finance, trade  reform,  deregulation,  and  privatization,  as well as 
significant  progress  in disinflation. More important,  Chile had entered 
a protracted  boom. Emerging from the deep recession of  1975, the 
growth  rate averaged  7.4 percent  from 1977 to 1981. Because econo- 
mists and financial observers piously believe that reform and stabili- 
zation must translate  into successful growth, and  because they feel that 
what grows is good, the story of Chile's reforms  was a positive one. 
As table 2 demonstrates, the economic boom and the opening of 
trade precipitated  a large trade deficit that peaked at more than 10 
percent  of GDP. This trade deficit, in part, reflected  a substantial  de- 
cline in the national  saving rate-private  saving fell sharply,  more  than 
offsetting an increase in public sector saving. In part, it reflected a 
sharp  increase in investment. 
Discussion about  the exchange rate was focused on the one hand  on 
the sustainability  of the external  balance, and on the other  hand  on the 
operation  of wage-price  adjustment.  The sustainability  discussion  could 
not go very far since financing was readily available-this  was still 
period of buildup for the first debt crisis-and  Chile's image of suc- 
cessful reform was nothing but positive. The availability  of unlimited Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  225 
Figure 1. Chile: Real Exchange  Rate, 1975-95;t 
Index, 1990= 100 
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Source: Data obtained directly from the J. P. Morgan currency index database. 
a. Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices. 
capital  without  a significant  premium  was key to creating  an atmosphere 
of prosperity  and removing traditional  external  constraints  to prosper- 
ity. Moreover, with investment  picking up and the budget in surplus, 
it was at first quite easy to argue  that the external  deficit was a private 
sector deficit and therefore  not a problem. 
The authorities  remained  steadfast  in their insistence that  the way to 
break  inflation  was by adhering  to a nominal anchor. And indeed, the 
scheme did work. In December 1980 wholesale price inflation was 
negative for the first time and, after a brief return  to inflation, prices 
fell every month between October 1981 and February  1982. But the 
decline was not sufficiently large to restore  competitiveness. The sud- 
den emergence of recession at the end of  1981 spelled trouble, and 
exorbitant  real interest  rates spread  the emerging  crisis. 
The large real appreciation  and the deteriorating  external balance 
raised the question of just how long the exchange rate peg could last. 
By then, it had  begun  to affect not only the timing  of trade  transactions, 226  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Table  2. Chile: Saving, Investment,  and Trade, 1978-82 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Savinga  12.6  12.4  13.9  8.2  2.1 
Investmenta  14.7  14.9  16.6  18.6  14.6 
Budget  surplUSa  1.5  3.3  4.5  0.8  -3.5 
Net exportsa  -  3.3  - 2.8  -4.2  -  10.3  -  1.9 
Importsb 
Consumer  goods  0.6  0.9  1.2  1.9  0.9 
Capital  goods  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.2  0.6 
Intermediates  1.8  2.5  2.9  3.2  2.0 
Source: Data for saving, investment, exports, and the budget surplus are from Corbo and Fischer (1994); and for imports, 
from Banco Central de Chile (1989). 
a. Percent of GDP. 
b. Billions of U.S.  dollars. 
but  also the financial  sector. Those who felt that  the rate  was overvalued 
and  would inevitably  be realigned  bought  durables  while they were "on 
sale" and borrowed  in pesos. Those who felt that the rate was sure to 
stay in place borrowed in dollars and lent in pesos. Thus domestic 
interest  rates started  to reflect both the scarcity of capital and the ex- 
pectation  of depreciation.  Peso-to-dollar  loan rate spreads  rose from 25 
percent  in 1979 to 44.9 percent in January  1982. Finance  Minister  De 
Castro  claimed in mid-1981: "Having a fixed exchange  rate  since mid- 
1979, and having the conditions to keep it that way indefinitely, have 
given  the Chilean economy  a great stability.  .  .  . Chile has today one 
of the most healthy, solid, and dynamic economies that can be found 
in the world.'''0 
Table 3 shows changes in Chile's foreign  reserves  and  external  debt. 
The restoration  of access to the international  capital  market  and  the high 
yield on loans, especially in pesos,  led banks and firms to borrow 
offshore in U.S.  dollars. Foreign reserves initially increased  sharply, 
along with private  sector external  debt;  then, inevitably, they started  to 
fall off, while debt continued  to rise. The period from mid-1981 until 
June 1982 represents the last phase of the failing program. Output 
started to fall rapidly (as shown in figure 2),  unemployment rose 
sharply,  the trade  deficit grew wider, reserves  fell, interest  rates  turned 
upward,  the rhetoric  became fiercer, and the skepticism  became more 
pronounced.  The peso was devalued by 18 percent in June 1982, and 
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Table  3. Chile: Foreign  Reserves  and External Debt 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
Indicator  1977  1980  1982 
Foreign  reserves  0.3  4.1  2.6 
Public  debt  3.5  4.7  5.2 
Private  debt  1.0  4.6  8.7 
Source: Banco Central de Chile (1989). 
by much more in the years to come. Part  of the reason  for this collapse 
was the deterioration of the external environment. Terms of trade 
dropped  by 20.3 percent between 1980 and 1982, and world interest 
rates increased sharply. These developments called into question the 
sustainability  of the deficit and led to higher  interest  rates, and hence a 
more dramatic  fall in output. 
The Chilean government  argued  that the collapse was solely due to 
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Source: Haindl (1986). 
a. Calculated as percentage change from four quarters  earlier. 228  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
the failure  of confidence and the adverse  external  environment.  Sebas- 
tian Edwards  and Alejandra  Cox Edwards  report  the government's  in- 
sistence that "correctly measured" international  inflation  was no dif- 
ferent  from inflation  in Chile, and hence no overvaluation  process was 
underway.  1  I This was hardly  the first  time that differences among var- 
ious price  indexes and  an insistence  on using the "right" one (typically, 
not the most readily available), and movements in the U.S.  dollar 
relative to other currencies  had been invoked to camouflage  an over- 
valuation. 
An alternative  view justifying the developments  in Chile conceded 
the fact of real appreciation  but countered with the fact of a major 
reform  and modernization.  By this argument,  real appreciation  results 
from capital inflows. Reform and renewed access to capital markets 
provided  both the incentive and the financing  for spending  in Chile. A 
real appreciation  was the obvious mechanism  to effect the transfer.  If 
the market  knows best, then real appreciation  is a market  price devel- 
opment requiring  no further  comment. That clearly is not always the 
case: opening trade, for example, necessitates an offsetting real depre- 
ciation if full employment  is to be maintained.  12 
The government  view is patently absurd;  all broadly  accepted  mea- 
surements  show real appreciation  in the case of Chile. The true  debate, 
then, is between the equilibrium  model and an indexation-inertia  inter- 
pretation. From this latter perspective, disinflation was unsuccessful 
because  of explicit indexation.  Disinflation  is possible only if sufficient 
recession is marshaled  to overcome the tendency for wage and price 
inflation  to persist as a result of overlapping  contracts  or relative wage 
effects. This view was out of favor for a while-having  ceded to a fully 
flexible model of pricing-but  it has made a comeback.  Thus, as back- 
ward-looking  indexation implied major  wage increases, the fixed cur- 
rency led almost automatically  to overvaluation. This indexation ar- 
rangement  was kept in place for the same length of time as the fixed 
rate. 
The alternative  view, emphasizing  reform-driven  opportunities  and, 
especially, the removal of capital constraints,  is not at all absurd,  but 
11. Edwards  and Edwards  (1987). 
12. See, for example, Dornbusch  (1974), which obtains  this result  in a model with 
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it only applies when the economy is strong.  13  It helps to explain spend- 
ing-why  the expansion could last, and why overvaluation  did not 
prompt a decline in demand for domestic goods. It cannot help in 
understanding  what happens  when the economy slows down, because 
with the sudden drop in demand, wages and prices should have col- 
lapsed to accommodate  the "crowding-in" required  to maintain  full 
employment.  14 
The devaluation  put an end to the nominal anchor. The sharp  dete- 
rioration  in the external  climate, both in the goods and  capital  markets, 
and the collapse of the banking  system made the adjustment  dramati- 
cally worse. In 1982 per capita  output  declined  by over 15 percent,  and 
unemployment  (including workers in public jobs programs)  rose to 
almost 30 percent. Inflation  was back. 
Chile returned  to miracle performance  only very gradually.  In hind- 
sight it must have started  in 1985-86,  after the country  had recovered 
from the initial recession and resolved its banking  problems. One cor- 
nerstone of the recovery strategy was a highly competitive real ex- 
change rate-in  1985-94  it was fully 40 percent below the level of 
1981. The destruction  of the financial  system (and  the associated  effects 
on investment and consumption  spending) and the decline in govern- 
ment spending  needed an offsetting crowding-in  that was delivered  by 
real depreciation.  The competitive real exchange rate, combined  with 
reform  and restructuring  of the economy, set the basis for an average 
growth  rate of 7.0 percent  in the period 1986-94. 
A particularly  interesting  feature  of Chile's performance  in the past 
decade is the relative disregard  for inflation. Over the past decade, 
inflation  has averaged 18.7 percent. That has not been an obstacle to 
growth. Moreover, at no time have policymakers  seriously entertained 
the notion of making inflation  the main priority  of economic strategy. 
Today inflation  is still at 8 percent, and falling; but fortunately  there  is 
no proposal  to make that perilous attempt  to use exchange rate policy 
for disinflation  to U.S.  levels. 
13. See Harberger  (1985), Edwards  (1985), and Morande  (1988). 
14. The argument  is reinforced  by the positive impact  of overvaluation  on real  wages 
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Table  4. Mexico:  Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1978-82 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
GDP  growtha  8.3  9.2  8.3  7.9  -0.6 
Inflationb  17.5  18.2  26.4  27.9  58.9 
Budget  surplusc  -2.7  -3.3  -3.0  -6.4  -  14.9 
Current  accountd  -  3.2  -5.5  -  10.8  -  16.1  -6.3 
Trade  balanced  -1.7  -2.8  -3.4  -3.8  6.8 
Source: Data for growth and inflation are from Ititernational Fitnanc  ial Statistics; and for the current account and trade 
balance, from Banco de Mexico (1995). 
a. Percent per year. 
b. Annual percentage change in CPI. 
c. Percent of GDP. 
d. Billions of U.S.  dollars. 
Mexico,  1978-82 
The Mexican crisis of 1982 is notorious  because it marked  the onset 
of the 1980s debt crisis.'5  Its significance here is in the emergence of 
an overvaluation, the persistence and expansion of its consequences, 
and  the ultimate  collapse. The year 1982 is notable  because,  just as the 
crisis year of 1994, it was an election year. 
In the period 1954-75 Mexico maintained  a fixed exchange rate as 
well as full and  unrestricted  convertibility  of its currency.  Inflation  was 
moderate  and the real exchange rate was stable. But in the runup  to the 
1976 election, overexpansion  led to inflation  which, in turn, necessi- 
tated a realignment. This policy decisively broke with a tradition  of 
conservative  monetary  management.  It opened the door to an extended 
period of discretionary  management, when recurrent  crises were the 
rule. Financial  adaptation  in the form of dollarization  and  capital flight 
were among the results. 
Table 4 shows the economic picture of Mexico during the period 
1978-82. The oil price increases  of the 1970s put  Mexico in a favorable 
external  balance position as an oil exporter  and with very strong cre- 
dentials for international  capital market  access. Government  spending 
skyrocketed and, high oil revenues notwithstanding, deficits blos- 
somed. Inflation, already  in double digits, increased  even further.  The 
current  account  turned  sharply  downward  and became negative. 
Where  do the sources of the Mexican crisis of 1982 lie? In terms  of 
the external  situation, very high interest  rates and the world recession 
15. See Dornbusch  (1986a), Solfs and  Zedillo (1985), and  Zedillo (1985). Rudiger  Dornbusch, llan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  231 
Table  5. Mexico:  Real Interest Rates and Real Exchange  Rates, 1978-83 
Units  as indicated 
Rate  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Real interest  ratea  -  1.8  -  3.8  -2.1  0.6  - 27.6  -  10.4 
Bilateral  real  exchange  rate"  100.3  105.3  114.0  121.7  84.6  77.6 
Multilateral  real  exchange  ratea  126.8  134.1  146.1  162.5  118.2  110.1 
Source: The real interest rate  and the bilateral real exchange rate  are from  International Financial Statistics; the multilateral 
real exchange rate is obtained directly from the J. P. Morgan currency index database. 
a. Average cost of funds less WPI inflation. 
b. Exchange rate index with respect to the United States based on the WPI. 1990 =  100. 
c. Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices,  1990 =  100. 
were clearly major  negative factors. However, their  effects were partly 
offset by high oil prices. The terms of trade  were actually 3.7 percent 
higher  in 1982 than  in 1980, although  they were below their 1981 peak. 
In the domestic context, three facts can be singled out. First, a 
massive fiscal expansion  and  an accompanying  rise in private  spending. 
The budget deficit increased by 3 percentage points of GDP for the 
1982 election alone. Second, as table 5 shows, with repressed  capital 
markets  and  administered  interest  rates, real  interest  rates  were negative 
and  thus helped to propel  the spending  boom. Third, the real exchange 
rate was allowed to appreciate. 
Figure 3 shows the nominal peso-to-dollar exchange rate and the 
relative  wholesale price index. Even though  inflation  was 20 percent  or 
higher, the nominal  exchange rate was held constant  from mid-  1978 to 
mid-1980. From mid-1980 until the first alignment in early 1982 the 
peso gradually depreciated  by 16 percent, while the annual inflation 
rate was nearly 30 percent. As a result the real exchange rate (using 
wholesale prices relative to those in the United States) appreciated 
steadily. By the end of 1981 the real exchange rate had appreciated  by 
37 percent  relative to the trough in 1977. The obvious overvaluation, 
the current  account deficit, and the emerging  problems  of financing  all 
spelled major  financial  trouble. 
Mexico had a convertible  currency.  In the presence  of overvaluation 
with negative real interest  rates, it was natural  that  asset holders  would 
seek to shift them abroad. And those who did not move their assets 
offshore shifted to dollar deposits in the Mexican banking system. 
Estimates  of capital  flight  in the period 1980-82 range  from 17.3 billion 
to 23.4 billion U.S.  dollars.'6 At the same time, the dollarization  of 
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Figure 3. Mexico: Nominal  Exchange  Rate and Relative  Wholesale  Price Index, 
1978-83a 
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Source: International Financial Statistics. 
a. Mexican WPI divided by U.S.  WPI. 
deposits moved from an average of about 20 percent  to more than 40 
percent.  17  Clearly  a crisis was in the making. The devaluations  of early 
1982, including an immediate  real depreciation  of 35 percent, did not 
go far enough. They worked  more to increase  financial  instability  than 
to resolve what by then was becoming a major  financial  crisis. As is 
common in Mexico, particularly  in an election year, the government 
chose to do too little too late. 
In the end, everything  came together:  an election year, uncertainties 
with respect to economic policies, populist economics in the form of 
bank  nationalizations  and  capital  controls, the impossibility  of borrow- 
ing on a scale that could finance interest, a debt moratorium  resulting 
from amortization  and the trade deficit, and increasing inflation. In a 
short period Mexico's international  status had changed from that of a 
big and favored borrower  to that of a pariah in capital markets. At 
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home, inflation  and currency  instability became the norm. Default on 
Mexdollars (dollar-denominated  Mexican liabilities) and the prospect 
of further  devaluations  promoted  capital flight. The first  devaluation  of 
68 percent  in February  1982 was ultimately  followed, after  the election, 
by the new government's  devaluation  of almost 100 percent  in Decem- 
ber, and much more in the following years. 
Like Chile's experience in the early 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 
1981-82 was also a dry  run  for the crisis of 1994-95. In both  instances, 
ready access to international  capital and the sudden halt of lending 
formed a precedent. In Chile, the emphasis on nominal anchors and 
credibility at any price was an important  precursor  of Mexico's expe- 
riences in the 1990s. In the case of Mexico in 1981-82,  the mix of 
election year priorities, fiscal expansion, rapid  domestic credit expan- 
sion, and overvaluation  was a direct preview of what came later. 
Finland,  1988-92 
The Finnish  experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s highlights 
once more the interaction of easy finance and a credibility-oriented 
inflation  strategy. However, as other  episodes have shown, overvalua- 
tion by itself is not enough to precipitate  the collapse of an exchange 
rate  regime. A financial  environment  that  accommodates  large  borrow- 
ing is one contributory  factor. In addition, there need to be certain 
disturbances  that will force an unsustainable  situation into an actual 
collapse. 
Even though Finland was not part of the EMS, in the 1980s the 
country increasingly simulated membership  by attempting  to peg its 
currency  to the system. The attempt  to hold onto this exchange  rate at, 
literally, any price proved tremendously  expensive. Table 6 details 
Finland's  economic picture  from 1984 to 1992. Overall, the 1980s was 
a period of economic liberalization and deregulation  in Finland. In 
particular, financial markets that had been severely repressed were 
opened, both in the domestic sphere and in respect to international 
borrowing  and lending. The financial boom led to increased wealth, 
higher asset prices, and hence to a spending boom. Strong terms of 
trade  reinforced  the feeling of prosperity.  At the outset the government 
did not participate;  in fact, through 1990 it ran a budget surplus. 
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Table  6. Finland: Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1984-92 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1984-87  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
GDP  growtha  3.2  4.9  5.7  0.0  -7.1  -3.8 
Inflationb  5.0  5.1  6.6  6.1  4.3  2.9 
Budget  surplusc  2.6  4.1  6.3  5.4  -1.5  -5.8 
Interest  rated  13.2  10.0  12.6  14.1  13.1  13.3 
Real  exchange  ratee  86.5  90.9  96.2  100.0  95.5  83.7 
Source: Data for growth and inflation are from International Financ ial Statistics; for the budget surplus and the interest 
rate, from OECD Economic Outlook; and for the real exchange rate, directly from the J. P. Morgan currency index database. 
a. Percent per year. 
b. Annual percentage change in CPI. 
c. Percent of GDP. 
d. Three-month Hellibor rate (annual rate). 
e.  Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices,  1990 =  100. 
real household wealth had increased  by almost 80 percent. Residential 
and nonresidential  investment  grew at rates of 10 and 15 percent, re- 
spectively. Real domestic demand was growing at an average of 6.5 
percent. By 1989, according to the OECD, the excess of output  over 
potential reached 6.4 percent. The major  problem  in this boom phase 
was inflation.  Throughout  the 1980s Finland,  like other  European  econ- 
omies, had been trying to achieve disinflation  and convergence. From 
double-digit levels in the early 1980s, inflation in fact came down to 
only 2.9  percent in 1987. But then, under the impact of the boom, 
inflation  accelerated,  and with wage settlements  near 10 percent  it shot 
up toward  6 percent  in 1988-89. 
Against this background,  the central  bank  had  been using a currency 
peg and  high interest  rates  to contain  and  roll back  inflationary  pressure. 
With interest rates of 12 to 14 percent, debt burdens  were piling up. 
Until the end of  1988 that was not a problem because assets were 
appreciating. But when high interest rates, reinforced by external 
shocks, squashed demand and spending, a full-blown recession de- 
scended. 
As table 7 shows, the end of prosperity  came very abruptly. The 
financial  boom went into reverse with pervasive  debt service problems 
and interest  rate risk from mismatches  in the balance sheets of banks. 
The collapse of Russian trade, a severe decline in the terms of trade, 
and  high real interest  rates  combined  to bring  down demand.  Moreover, 
as is common in the aftermath  of deregulation,  the banking  system had 
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Table  7. Finland: Demand and Unemployment,  1983-92 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1983-88  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Real  domestic  demanda  6.5  7.6  -1.3  -9.2  -6.4 
Unemployment  rateb  5.1  3.5  3.5  7.6  13.1 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
a. Annual percentage change. 
b. Percent of total labor force. 
in March  1989 the central  bank  made  matters  worse by appreciating  the 
currency  as an anti-inflationary  shock treatment.'8  In 1990-91 output 
plunged, and in 1992 the unemployment  rate reached double digits. 
Finland had entered a depression. Real household wealth declined, 
consumption  plummeted,  and investment  took a nose dive. 
In this difficult setting the government  made the surprising  decision 
to peg the Finnish markka  to the European  Currency  Unit (ECU) in 
June 1991, without a prior devaluation. At the outset the interest  rate 
spread  relative to Germany  declined, as shown in figure  4. But Finnish 
interest  rates did not stay low for long, and the depression-like  atmo- 
sphere and growing debt problems soon made high interest rates im- 
plausible. In November 1991 the markka  was devalued. The exchange 
rate was pegged at this new level but, once again, interest  rates rose 
until, in April 1992, foreign exchange support agreements  with the 
central  banks of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Germany  began to 
take effect. Finally, in October 1992, the markka  was allowed to float. 
Throughout  the crisis the discussion about  the exchange  rate  focused 
on credibility:  its influence on interest  rates and hence, on demand. It 
was thought  that the effective way to bring down interest  rates was to 
emulate  Germany's  anti-inflationary  stance, rather  than  to maintain  an 
undervalued  currency.  Note that by this time inflation  had  ceased to be 
an issue-in  1992 producer  price inflation was down to 2.6 percent, 
and consumer  price inflation  stood at 2.9 percent, against  4 percent  in 
Germany.  The high interest rate strategy  and the overvalued  currency 
meant that there could be no crowding-in. Moreover, the policy was 
extremely  expensive, especially because Finland  operated  as an overly 
generous  welfare state. Between 1989 and 1992 net external  liabilities 
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Figure 4. Nominal Finnish-German  Interest Rate Spreada 
Percentage  point  difference 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues. 
a. The Finnish three-month Hellibor rate less the German three-month Interbank  lending rate (annual rates). 
increased  sharply, from $27 billion to $47 billion, and the public debt 
exploded, increasing  from $17.4 billion to $44 billion. 
There  is very little question  that  the central  bank  and  the government 
were quite wrong to overvalue the currency-trade  deterioration,  in 
terms of both prices and markets, and the domestic credit collapse 
required  a serious  dose of crowding-in.  The effective way to accomplish 
that was not by a continued squeeze in financial markets  and record 
unemployment-driven  deficits. A shift to a more  competitive  currency, 
possibly accompanied  by restrictive  fiscal policy, would have helped  to 
solve both the unemployment  and the debt problems. 
Finland  was certainly  not alone in its attempt  to buy credibility  with 
a hard  currency  posture.  The United Kingdom, Spain, and  Italy  did  just 
the same. Finland is the most interesting  case, however, because the 
disturbances  and the collapse of the financial system were so obvious 
in their implication for real depreciation, as has been borne out by 
developments since the realignment. The export sector has been the 
driving force of economic recovery (aided by the world economy), 
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though  the slowdown in 1991-93 was severe, the growth  rate  for 1995- 
96 is expected to be 5 percent. 
Mexico,  1990-94 
Just  over a decade  after  the debt  moratorium  and  collapse of the early 
1980s, Mexico found itself in the same situation. Once again it was in 
an election year, once again finance was accommodating  and the ex- 
change rate was overvalued. The principal  actors were different, but 
the script was much the same. All the stabilization,  restructuring,  and 
reform  that  the country  had  undergone  was cast aside in a single-minded 
attempt  to cover up the problems and get strong election results. Be- 
cause the team was so good, substantively  and in its public relations, 
the scheme almost  worked. As is almost always the case, though, some 
impediments  remained,  notably  political uncertainty  in the transition  to 
a new government. 
Without question, Mexico moved forward  dramatically  during the 
1980s. In response to the shock of a debt moratorium  and inflation  in 
excess of 200 percent,  economic policy became  very conservative.  That 
shift was facilitated by the bankruptcy  of populism throughout  Latin 
America,  and  the emergence  of a consensus  on market-oriented  reforms 
such as trade  liberalization,  privatization,  deregulation,  and stabiliza- 
tion.'9  It was also facilitated  by the return  of international  lending, even 
before debt had been restructured  using Brady bonds. The vigor, per- 
severance, and effectiveness of the Mexican reforms  attracted  interna- 
tional attention. They were carried  far enough for Mexico to succeed 
in the negotiation of a North American  free trade agreement.  To the 
financial  world, Mexico was a new country. 
This confidence in Mexico was not fully warranted  in macroeco- 
nomic terms, for three specific reasons. First, growth was very low, 
both absolutely and, even more so, relative to the 3 percent  growth  in 
the labor force. In fact in 1993 per capita income was barely higher 
than it had been fifteen years earlier and was 9 percent  lower than its 
peak in 1981. The full effect of reform  would take time, but the signs 
of reform-driven  growth  were quite absent. The second issue was con- 
tinuing  inflation.  Even though  the inflation  rate  had  been brought  down 
dramatically,  it remained  in the 20 to 30 percent  range, far out of line 
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Table  8. Mexico:  Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1990-94 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
GDP  growtha  4.5  3.6  2.8  0.6  3.5 
Inflationb  29.9  18.8  11.9  8.3  7.1 
Current  accountc  -  3.1  -5.2  -7.5  -6.5  -7.8 
Trade  balancec  - 1.8  -4.0  -6.3  -5.2  -6.5 
Real  exchange  rated  77.4  85.9  93.3  99.3  90.6 
Source: Data for growth, inflation, and the real exchange rate are from the International  Monetary  Fund's WorldEconiomizic 
Outlook; and for the trade balance, from Internationial  Financial Statistics and Banco de Mexico (1995). 
a. Percent per year. 
b. December-to-December percentage change in CPI. 
c.  Percent of GDP. 
d. Effective exchange rate index,  1980 =  100. 
with what Mexican policymakers  considered  politically convenient or 
economically acceptable. The third issue, and the main problem  as it 
turned  out, was once again the real appreciation  of the peso. Table 8 
provides some of the principal  macroeconomic  indicators. 
Through  a series of pacto  programs,  the government  succeeded in 
bringing  inflation  down to single-digit levels.20  These  pacto  agreements 
invariably  held back the rate of currency  depreciation  relative  to wage 
and price movements in Mexico. As a result the real exchange rate 
steadily appreciated. Over the period 1988-93,  Mexico's wholesale 
prices in dollars increased by 55.5 percent. By comparison,  the U.S. 
wholesale price index increased  by 11. 1 percent. An index of the real 
exchange  rate  on a multilateral  basis prepared  by the International  Mon- 
etary Fund (IMF) shows a real appreciation  of 36 percent over this 
period.  21 
In Mexico the end of a sexenio (six-year presidential  term)  is almost 
sure to bring a collapse of the exchange rate. Growth  is necessary for 
good elections, and inflation needs to be moderate.  The temptation  is 
invariably  to use the nominal exchange rate for inflation  control, sup- 
plemented  more  or less successfully with an incomes policy. The runup 
to the 1994 election was no different. 
Formally, the Mexican peso was flexible within a band that had a 
fixed floor and a moderately  depreciating  ceiling. In fact, the peso was 
basically held constant from 1991. The ongoing inflation  differential 
20.  For details, see Dornbusch  and Werner  (1994). 
21.  International  Monetary  Fund's World  Economic Outlook, May 1995, p.  92. 
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thus meant increasing  real appreciation over  and above  what already 
had accumulated in the previous years.  Real appreciation was not tan- 
tamount to overvaluation.  The reforms,  the trade opportunities arising 
from  the  NAFTA,  and  the  return to  the  capital  market implied  an 
improvement  in  Mexico's  economic  situation  that could  reasonably 
translate into a sustainable rise of wages and prices in dollars. The issue 
was  to  draw  a  line  between  warranted real  appreciation  and  over- 
valuation. 
The Mexican  authorities were adamant that the peso  was not over- 
valued,  and they reaffirmed this belief  at every  opportunity.  In doing 
so,  they tended to use productivity  growth as an additional argument 
for competitiveness,  over  and above  measures based on traded goods 
prices.22 With productivity growth estimated at 6 to 8 percent, Mexico 
could  not possibly  be uncompetitive.  The trade results showed  other- 
wise.  While  the  country  did  have  significant  export  growth,  import 
growth was much higher, and as a result the trade deficit was widening, 
even though the economy  was not booming. 
Most striking, the Bank of Mexico  seems not to have drawn the right 
inferences.  Its 1995 annual report states: 
In spite of the progress made during 1994 . . .  a reversal of capital 
inflows occurred  during  certain  periods. This was the result  of the crim- 
inal offenses and unfortunate  political events that took place during  the 
year, which had a negative impact on the expectations of  economic 
agents. Thus, towards  the end of the year, conditions  of profound  insta- 
bility in financial markets  arose, in spite of the tight monetary  policy 
implemented  to contain  them. ... 
Economic  analysts  frequently  mention  the current  account  deficit and 
the appreciation  of the real exchange rate  as the main causes behind  the 
devaluation  of the peso in late December.  However, this claim overlooks 
a series of other very important  factors. When a country  receives huge 
capital  inflows, it is inevitable  that  the real exchange  rate  tends  to appre- 
ciate. As long as the appreciation  of the real exchange rate is accom- 
panied by increases in the productivity  of labor, the country will not 
experience a loss of competitiveness. The extraordinary  expansion of 
Mexican  exports within the last few years is testimony  that the compet- 
22.  For  a vigorous  statement  of this position  (anonymous,  but  authored  by the Banco 
de Mexico), see Banamex-Accival  (1994). This flawed  argument  concerning  productiv- 
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Table  9. Mexico:  Budget Surplus and Credit Creation, 1990-94 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Budget  surplusa  7.7  8.7  8.7  3.7  2.3 
Credit  creationb  22.6  31.6  20.8  15.5  32.0 
Development  banks  -  10.1  18.8  23.4  47.4  42.2 
Source: Data for the budget surplus are from Banco de Mexico (1995); and forcredit creation, from lInternzatioial  Finlanic(ial 
Statistics. 
a. Primary budget as a percentage of GDP. 
b. Nominal annual percentage change. 
itiveness of domestic industry  was not eroded  by the real appreciation  of 
the peso.23 
In hindsight it is clear that the Mexican exchange rate was highly 
vulnerable,  and  the same  judgment  could have  been made  ex ante. First, 
it was clear  that  disinflation  was stalling, implying  that  real  appreciation 
would continue for two years or more. Second, Mexican growth was 
very moderate indeed. In the election year fiscal spending was in- 
creased, concentrated  on the third quarter,  but otherwise growth was 
low. Third, Mexico had undergone  a comprehensive  unilateral  trade 
liberalization.  Theory  leaves no doubt  that  a trade  liberalization  requires 
an offsetting real depreciation, if full employment  is to be achieved. 
Domestic fiscal expansion, a drop in the saving rate, or an investment 
boom can temporarily  provide the crowding-in  required  by such a lib- 
eralization.  But there will be a trade  deficit that will grow as domestic 
spending  increases. If no financing  is found, the result will be either a 
deep recession, or a deep real depreciation,  or both. Hence the vulner- 
ability of the exchange rate. 
Mexico's fall from star performer  came during  the course of 1994. 
First, domestic political events disturbed  the markets-the  Chiapas 
uprising drew international  attention  to a country deeply divided be- 
tween its business-oriented  north and its Central  American, guerrilla- 
style south. Next, the assassination  of the presidential  candidate  called 
in question the political regime. But the government  managed  to keep 
the economy on track  for the election. The central  bank  fully sterilized 
the politically motivated  capital  flight, and as table 9 shows, the devel- 
opment banks created credit without pause, and the treasury spent 
money wherever  the election outcome was predicted  to be tight, thus 
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Table  10. Mexico:  Debt Composition, 1990-94 
Billions  of 1990  Mexican  pesos 
Type  of debt  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Cetesa  31.9  26.7  27.6  52.2  13.5 
Tesobonosb  0.1  0.9  0.8  3.3  75.1 
Source: Banco de Mexico (1995). 
a. Treasury bills. 
b. Indexed to free market exchange rate. 
further  reducing the primary  surplus. This increase in spending was 
reflected  in the very large deficit in the external  balance. 
By late 1994, with the new government  in place and no good news 
to hold out for, the situation  worsened. Devaluation  was discussed and 
major  capital flight set in almost immediately. The IMF report  on the 
Mexican collapse leaves room to infer the indiscretions  that allowed 
Mexican asset holders  to take their money out in time.24  As soon as the 
first, insufficient  devaluation  of 15.6 percent  took place, investors  with- 
drew en masse. The reserves were not there to meet the withdrawals, 
liabilities were suddenly seen to be large and liquid, and panic and 
chaos ensued. 
The fallout of the Mexican overvaluation  was severely complicated 
in two ways. First, in order  to continue  to attract  foreign  capital  despite 
political  difficulties  and  fears  of overvaluation,  the government  allowed 
its debt to become both very liquid and dollar-denominated.  In 1994 
the relative ratios of peso and dollar short-term  debt-cetes  and teso- 
bonos-moved  sharply, as shown in table 10. The second factor was 
the keen sense of fraud  felt by investors  who had been ardently  assured 
throughout  the year that devaluation  would never happen. Having run 
off its reserves and dissipated its credibility, the Mexican government 
did not have the wherewithal  to pay. Markets  disappeared,  and had it 
not  been for the U. S. -IMF intervention,  Mexico would  once again  have 
defaulted. 
In part as a result of the U.S.  congressional  and IMF involvement, 
the autopsy of Mexico's collapse has not yet concluded. To some, it 
was simply due to a wrongheaded  devaluation  when tight money could 
have saved the situation. To others, it was the result  of bungling  man- 
agement, pending the NAFTA. Yet to still others, it occurred  because 
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Table  11. Common  Factors  of Currency Collapses 
Chile  Mexico  Mexico  Finland 
Factor  1982  1982  1994  1992 
Appreciation  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Disinflation  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
External  deficit  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fiscal  expansion  No  Yes  Yes  No 
High  real  interest  rates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade  liberalization  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Financial  opening  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Domestic  credit  creation  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opening  to external  capital  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
the currency was overvalued  and was awaiting the appearance of some 
adverse condition,  any adverse condition. 
Summary 
It is useful to try to identify the common elements of the experiences 
discussed  above.  As table 11 illustrates,  candidates include real appre- 
ciation,  deterioration in the current account, heavy external borrowing, 
distress  of  the  financial  system,  poor  growth,  inflation  stabilization 
programs,  and high real interest rates. The fact that so many of these 
features  occurred  together  helps  to  explain  why  the crashes  were  so 
massive  and look quite similar. 
The EMS  Experience 
Almost  a year after the Mexican  currency collapse,  the discussion 
continues  as to what exactly  happened.  The magnitude of the collapse 
adds to the confusion  because  it suggests  (and for some,  proves)  that 
the supposedly  corrective currency realignment was a great mistake. It 
is striking to compare this and the other collapses  discussed  above with 
the currency realignments  that took  place  in Europe in  1992.  In the 
making these  seemed  traumatic, but once  completed  they seemed  like 
a liberation.  By contrast, the Chilean,  Finnish,  and Mexican collapses 
were each part of a deep and lasting setback in the economic  and social 
performance of the respective  country. 
The four collapse  episodes  stand out for being  extreme events.  To Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  243 
Table  12. The EMS Realignments 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
GDP  growtha 
Italy  2.9  2.1  1.3  0.7  -0.7  1.7 
Spain  4.7  3.7  2.2  0.7  -  1.1  2.0 
United  Kingdom  2.2  0.4  -2.0  -0.5  2.2  3.8 
Real interest  rateb 
Italy  . .  .  6.2  8.3  14.9  -4.9  - 3.9 
Spain  9.0  11.8  10.7  11.5  7.8  3.7 
United  Kingdom  9.7  7.3  4.8  4.4  1.5  3.5 
Real  exchange  ratec 
Italy  93.1  100.0  101.0  98.3  85.0  83.2 
Spain  96.9  100.0  98.2  95.3  83.1  79.3 
United  Kingdom  98.0  100.0  103.0  100.5  92.1  93.3 
Source: Data for growth and the real interest rate are from International Finianc(ial  Statistics; and for the real exchange 
rate, directly from the J. P. Morgan currency index database. 
a. Percent per year. 
b. Nominal less WPI inflation. 
c.  Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices,  1990 =  100. 
complete the discussion, three more moderate examples have been 
drawn  from  the context  of the EMS  in 1992:  Italy, Spain, and  the United 
Kingdom. Annual data on each country's performance  are shown in 
table 12. The common denominators  are the attempt  to converge on 
German  inflation, the overvaluation  that emerged in the process, the 
inability  to hold on to high enough interest  rates  to defend  the rates  and 
roll back inflation, and the ultimate  collapse. The interesting  question 
to ask of these cases is whether, unlike in the extreme  episodes, over- 
valuation  was quite  obvious and  devaluation  was inevitable;  or whether, 
in a standoff  between skeptical  investors  and  less-than-fully  committed 
policymakers,  devaluation  may have happened  "by accident." 
The cases had three features in common before the devaluations: 
high real interest rates, real appreciation,  and a slowdown in growth. 
In each case disinflation  was the official objective, and in each case its 
success raised the unemployment  rate to uncomfortable  levels, leaving 
open the question of whether  policymakers  had the stomach  for more. 
Moreover, each situation was complicated  by a single external  event: 
Germany's  unification  had raised that country's  inflation  to unaccepta- 
ble levels and brought  about a shift to tight money. 
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any detail.25  Suffice it to say that  convergence  was incomplete,  in terms 
of both actual results and persuading  markets  that a deep and lasting 
change of institutions  and attitudes  had in fact taken place. Growth  in 
the beleaguered  economies was poor, and unemployment  was rising. 
There was no prospect  of a rapid  change in the economic environment 
that would allow a major reduction in interest rates. Germany  was 
fighting rampant  inflation, and speculators were on the lookout for 
opportunities.  Once it was clear that  EMS guarantees  were limited, and 
reserves were small relative to the scope for attacks, one currency  fell 
after another.26 
The real depreciation  of the currencies  that fell to attacks  was sur- 
prisingly large. The initiating real appreciations  were quite moderate 
compared  to the actual depreciations, and even interest differentials 
hardly  suggested  the size of depreciations  that  eventually  materialized. 
In each case, the collapse of the currency  spelled immediate  and sub- 
stantial  relief. Real interest rates fell, and economic growth  resumed. 
It soon seemed as if the real losers might  be the countries  that  had held 
out. Discussion focused on interest rates; in particular,  whether real 
rates were lower under  the hard-money  policies of France  or the soft- 
money policies of the United Kingdom. Another  issue was whether  the 
countries  whose currencies  had collapsed would be overtaken  by a bad 
spell of inflation  before having had time to reap the benefits of a cur- 
rency realignment.  Advocates of hard  money were sure that  the loss of 
confidence  would have to be paid for dearly. 
So far, hardly  any of these pessimistic predictions  have been realized 
and  to the extent that they have, the setting is quite different.  With the 
exchange rate constraint  removed, the United Kingdom has enjoyed 
low interest rates and strong growth. Italy has entered a boom, and 
even in Spain, growth  has been good. Inflation  is an issue-more  so in 
Italy and Spain than in the United Kingdom-but  given the size of the 
depreciations,  there is surprisingly  little of it. 
In sum, the EMS collapses of 1992 were quite positive events. This 
is not at all true of the four collapses reported  above. The difference 
lies,  in large measure, in the financial fallout of the initial misalign- 
25.  Reviews of the EMS experience  can be found in Bacchetta  (1994), Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1994), Micossi and Padoan  (1994), Portes  (1993), and Vaciago (1993). 
26.  Agenor, Bhandari, and Flood (1992) and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 
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ments.  In Chile,  Finland,  and Mexico  protracted overvaluation,  high 
interest rates, and the large balance sheet impacts of the currency align- 
ments destroyed the banking system,  and thus threw a big shadow over 
prospects for growth.  Whereas in the EMS collapse  there seem only to 
be winners (apart from the central banks), in these other cases it is hard 
to find one. 
What Went Wrong? 
The interesting  feature  of the four extreme episodes reported  above 
is  their sudden, harsh end. In each case policy was thought to be 
successful, prosperity  prevailed, credibility was intact or being built 
up, and policymakers  rode high. Then the entire strategy  unraveled  in 
almost no time and gave way to a large realignment.  Invariably  it is 
asked what went wrong. 
Major  misalignments  can arise because, absent  a clear and accepted 
test for the right  price for a currency,  there  is room  for serious  disagree- 
ment. The same is true  for the stock market  or in real  estate. The factors 
influencing  the exchange rate are diffuse and prospective,  just as they 
are for asset prices. Once a misalignment  is in place, it is difficult to 
undo quickly, for both political and economic reasons. That is why it 
will ultimately  precipitate  a collapse. 
In the extreme cases discussed above, market  participants  differed 
in their  opinions  of the sustainability  of the policy regimes. Policymak- 
ers and much of the market  had little doubt  that they were sustainable, 
and that reserve depletion would be short-lived. They believed (and 
perhaps  still do) that had it not been for this or that surprising  factor, 
all would have been well. It was not the policy that  was wrong, but the 
accidental  disturbance  that interfered  with short-term  financing. This 
interpretation  is captured  by the "sudden stop" in the bankers'  adage 
quoted at the beginning of the paper. But it is overly benign. If an 
exchange rate and current  account  position is vulnerable  to disruption, 
then the currency  is more than likely to be overvalued. 
What  actually  goes wrong involves both the policies that  created  the 
vulnerability  and the lenders who jump ship. In such situations, poli- 
cymakers  are invariably  surprised  by how the market  can suddenly  turn 
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Table  13. Latin America and Mexico: Total  Return  on Stock Market  in U.S. Dollars 
Percent 
1994  1995 
Jan.-  Oct.-  Jan.- 
1991  1992  1993  Sept.  Dec.  July 
Latin  America  123.5  5.7  56.6  -0.1  -21.0  -10.0 
Mexico  106.8  21.2  49.9  -40.6  -  38.9  -  19.2 
Source: International  Finance Corporation  ( 1995). For 1995, obtained directly from the International  Finance Corporation. 
vulnerability. Markets, in turn, are surprised  by how little liquidity 
there is when all the lenders scramble  to get out at the same time. The 
combination makes for a chaotic collapse and the disruption  of  fi- 
nance.27  Moreover, because the policy regime is typically sustained  by 
strong appeal to credibility, any action that undermines  this will pro- 
foundly disorient  the lenders, thus aggravating  the lack of credit. 
Why do markets  keep financing  a situation  that  to all appearances  is 
vulnerable, if not outright unsustainable?  Ex post this is always the 
question, whether in relation to the stock market,  to tulip bubbles, to 
real estate, or to emerging market  lending.28  The answer is that there 
are different  opinions of what is happening.  Moreover,  there  is always 
a temptation  to ride an unsustainable  course for a little while. In fact, 
the capital market  was exuberantly  willing to lend in the Chilean and 
Mexican crises. After net negative portfolio investment in 1983-89, 
Latin  America  received an average  of $26.6 billion in portfolio  capital 
flows over the period 1990-94.  For a while, stock returns  bore out the 
wildest optimism, as table 13 shows. A dominant share of  market 
participants  thought that the risks were small and well worth taking; 
they thought that the policies were right and sustainable, and would 
increasingly  be vindicated  by events. 
In its postmortem  of the recent events in Mexico, the IMF proposed 
three hypotheses of the cause of the collapse-adverse  shocks, an un- 
sustainable  external  position, and  policy slippage-and  concluded  that 
all three were probably  responsible.29  For the purposes  of this paper  it 
is interesting  to consider  the economic model that  markets  use to frame 
27.  For a model where financial  fragility  magnifies  shocks and  generates  crises, see 
Goldfajn  and Valdes (1995). 
28.  See Krugman  (1995). 
29.  International  Monetary  Fund's World  Economic  Outlook,  May 1995. Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  247 
events, in order  to understand  how a large real appreciation  can persist 
for an extended period of time. The answer  has to be that a near-term 
collapse is implausible,  and  that  accordingly,  market  participants  either 
disregard  the possibility or else feel sufficiently liquid to discount the 
event. As a result, the actual collapse comes as a surprise. 
There are three basic perspectives on real exchange rates: the mo- 
netarist  view, the classical view, and the disequilibrium  view. These 
summary  names contrast  their essential features, but as is always the 
case, they do not take account  of variations  and special themes within 
each approach.  The views clearly overlap  to some extent, but the point 
here is to highlight how the fall in the real exchange rate can be per- 
ceived as a disequilibrium  by some, and by others, as a price that is 
fully justified and appropriate. 
The Monetarist  View 
This perspective  is both naive and influential.  It is held by much of 
Wall Street, some members  of Congress, and the Wall  Street  Journal's 
editorial page. Simply put, this view favors hard monetary  commit- 
ments, low taxes, and free markets.  Holding fast to such policies will, 
in time, yield rewards;  if the government  wavers, it will falter; if it 
caves in, it will fall. Applied to Mexico in 1994 this means  that  the key 
mistake was the failure to control credit and, under attack, to raise 
interest  rates  high enough to convince markets  that  the government  was 
sincerely and fully committed  to currency  stability. 
In the monetarist  view, anything  is acceptable  except raising taxes 
or devaluing  the currency.  Because it is influential  in finance,  this view 
has also become a very decisive influence in the policy discussions of 
countries  with vulnerable  exchange rates. In the case of Mexico, it is 
interesting  to note that proponents  of the monetarist  view do not pay 
too much attention  to fiscal policy, particularly  since tax increases are 
not at issue.  Moreover, they did not monitor monetary  policy very 
closely, although  they did discuss it after  the fact. Mexico's misguided 
monetary  policy was raised as an issue after  the collapse by Congress, 
the U.S. Treasury,  and  Jeffrey  Sachs and  his colleagues, and  then  many 
others jumped on the bandwagon.30  Some observers recommended 
30.  See Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995). 248  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
bringing the peso back to its initial level.31 To this end, a currency 
board  was deemed the best way to instill confidence. 
The monetarist  view is naive in that it cannot account for the fact 
that Mexico had ceased to grow, its banking system was becoming 
increasingly  fragile, and  the government  would certainly  have confused 
investors  if, in the runup  to an election, it had staged  a major  recession. 
Moreover,  it offers no insight  on how a high interest  rate  strategy  would 
have brought  back growth.  The assumption  that  posturing  is sufficient  is 
definitely  not vindicated  by the European  experience;  Sweden's  brief at- 
tempt  with  80 percent  interest  rates  in September  1992  bears  remembering! 
The Classical  View 
This perspective is thoroughly founded in the informed markets, 
flexible wages and prices, and maximizing agents posited by equilib- 
rium theory, and offers an important  benchmark  against which any 
disequilibrium  view must be held. An equilibrium  perspective  would 
naturally  be an economist's first and preferred  framework  of analysis. 
In this view real exchange rates are market prices, similar to stock 
prices, and when conditions are favorable in a country, the real price 
of its currency goes up. Moreover, economic agents faced with im- 
proving  productivity  act appropriately  when they consume  today a por- 
tion of the increased  incomes of the future. 
Real appreciation  is an assessment  of a country's  performance  made 
by an approving  market.  It is the reward  for reform, stabilization,  and 
doing good and right. Capital inflows are the outright  commitment  to 
such policies, and  real appreciation  is the adjustment  process  that  trans- 
lates increased  lending into equilibrium  transfers.  This view has much 
to commend  it, particularly  in the early  phases  of reform  and  stabilization. 
Indeed, it is hard to find fault with it until much later, when growth 
vanishes  and  loans go sour, and  even then  its validity  is ambiguous. 
Because external  deficits represent  an increase  in absorption  relative 
to income, in this view,  the increased absorption  is precisely what 
should be happening. If capital formation is increasing, the story is 
simple. If it is the consumption  of durable  goods that  is increasing,  who 
can blame the consumer  for reaching  out to all the things  that  are  finally 
31.  See David Malpass, "The Mexican Peso: 3.5 or Bust," Wall Street Journal, 
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available and affordable?  If a budget deficit lies behind the spending 
boom, and if future revenues seem assured, who can blame a govern- 
ment  for smoothing  consumption  and  investment  in anticipation  of later 
earnings? 
Yet if the long-run  policies were valid, they should  have led to rising 
standards  of living or a boom in investment.  The equilibrium  view does 
not pay attention  to actual  growth  performance,  but  concentrates  instead 
on policy talk. This is an important  issue here, since Mexico had very 
poor growth performance  in comparison  to that of Chile or the Asian 
economies. The moderate  growth  observed in 1994, after  no growth  at 
all in 1993, was due to a budget shift that was planned to coincide 
exactly with the election quarter.  Fiscal policy went into an expansion- 
ary mode in 1994, and the market  showed no concern. 
The classical approach  can rationalize  real appreciation  by pleading 
improved economic prospects and hence, a rise in the valuation of 
resources. Because the factors influencing asset prices, including the 
real exchange rate, are diffuse and their translation  to valuation is 
imprecise, there is inevitably a broad  zone of uncertainty  between real 
appreciation  and overvaluation. But this view, while recognizing the 
uncertainty  in valuation, would reject the hypothesis of systematic, 
significant  overvaluation.32 
Both the classical and the monetarist  approaches  accept that confi- 
dence can be an issue, but they argue that it is a straightforward  one. 
The most dangerous  path is to compromise a conservative monetary 
(and  fiscal) stance. It is even worse to allow the currency  to be devalued 
(the term "debauched" is sometimes used in this context).33 
Two of the IMF  explanations  for the most recent  Mexican  collapse- 
adverse shocks and policy  slippage-fit  the equilibrium approach. 
Much would be made of the changed political outlook in Mexico. It 
would be argued that whereas under President Salinas and with the 
NAFTA on the horizon  there  was no limit to the positive prospects,  the 
institutional and political instability that became apparent  in 1994 
opened the doors to almost unlimited  bad news. As to policy slippage, 
it would be argued that now that it is known how extensive credit 
32.  In addition, there is a strand  of theory that interprets  real appreciation  as the 
response  to temporary  or incredible  reform;  see Calvo and Vegh (1993). 
33.  A different  approach  makes much  of the backing  of the stock of money-base, 
M2, and others;  see Calvo and Mendoza  (1995) and Calvo (1995). 250  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
expansion  actually  was-including  the contribution  of the development 
banks-the  bad outcome is hardly  surprising. 
The classical view presents  a plausible story of what  happens  before 
a collapse. It lends support  to those who believe that the rate is not 
misaligned  and should be defended. When growth  stops and bad loans 
accumulate, however, the story wears thin. In the case of Mexico, 
surprisingly  little attention was paid to growth performance;  in fact, 
wishful thinking  and  the fiscal expansion  of last quarter  of 1994 seemed 
to be more important. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that all too often reform  is equated 
with productivity  enhancement,  and  from  there  it is a short  step to value 
creation  and  equilibrium  real appreciation.  But it is necessary  to distin- 
guish between different  kinds of reform:  those that shed labor, such as 
reducing  the size of the government  or unilateral  trade liberalization, 
require  a lower dollar  wage (although  they may raise the stock market). 
A far  more  differentiated  view is therefore  required  when  judging  which 
way the exchange rate might move. 
The Disequilibrium  View 
This paper  contends that the real exchange rate is a variable  that is 
significantly  influenced  by policy, not in all cases (Argentina,  discussed 
below, is an exception), but in many. Policymakers  might  be misled to 
yield to real appreciation  and  financing  deficits, but  ultimately  the coun- 
try will pay with a collapse. 
While reform  and stabilization  are important,  it is also a basic prem- 
ise that some reforms require crowding-in, not crowding-out. These 
reforms  involve restructuring  and opening the economy, both of which 
free labor and thus require  the creation of employment. Unless there 
is a lasting investment boom with significant domestic content, real 
demand  for domestic goods and services and for labor  must be raised. 
If trade is  liberalized, this liberalization must be accompanied by 
real depreciation. If exports collapse, real depreciation  must correct 
the shortage of  labor demand. If budget cutting or reform reduces 
employment, they must be accompanied  by real depreciation  to create 
jobs. Whereas  the equilibrium  approach  values a country  primarily  in 
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more-the  disequilibrium  view focuses on the goods and  labor  market. 
The reforms  make it possible to finance  deficits, but they do not solve 
the issues of employment and growth; in contrast, real depreciation 
does. 
To interpret  the real exchange rate as a policy-influenced  or even 
policy-dominated variable, the disequilibrium view starts from the 
proposition  that there is some degree of inertia in the level or rate of 
change of  wages and prices. This may be the result of an explicit 
indexation  scheme, as in Chile, of a formal  incomes policy agreement, 
as in Mexico, or of implicit indexation, such as might arise from insi- 
der-outsider  models. But stickiness is the basic ingredient.  Once stick- 
iness is accepted, and also the influence of policymakers  on the real 
exchange rate through  the setting of nominal rates, the real exchange 
rate is seen to be a limited policy variable. The statement  is no more 
controversial  than the assertion that the real quantity of money is a 
policy variable, in the sense that changes in the nominal quantity  of 
money exert a substantial  and relatively lasting influence on the real 
quantity  of money. If the change is appropriate  as an offset to a dis- 
equilibrium,  then it is, in fact, a lasting change in the equilibrium  real 
quantity of  money. In exactly the same sense,  changes in the real 
exchange rate resulting from nominal exchange rate movements can 
bring about the change in equilibrium  relative prices that is called for 
by a disequilibrium  in the real economy. Whether  to accomplish the 
relative change by nominal exchange rate movements, rather than 
through  inflation  or deflation, is the relevant  policy decision. 
As a policy variable,  the real  exchange  rate  is limited  in two respects. 
First, in a boom it is hard  to avoid real appreciation  without  engaging 
in an escalating inflation-depreciation  cycle.  Second, once the attack 
occurs, the financing  to sustain an overvaluation  runs out. But in be- 
tween, when the boom is over and the financing  continues, policy can 
sustain  a situation  of overvaluation,  and can even make it worse. Spe- 
cifically, a policy of bringing down inflation by slowing the rate of 
depreciation  below the rate of inflation-or  stopping depreciation  al- 
together-is  a common  way of creating  overvaluation.  Because the real 
exchange rate is sticky downward,  overvaluation  is not easily undone 
by wage-price deflation and thus, ultimately, leads to collapse and 
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Policy  Implications 
These differences in interpretation  have a stark implication for 
policymaking. Proponents  of the equilibrium  view, and even more so 
of the narrow monetarist view,  will  advocate inflation stabilization 
without  much question. They might disagree on whether  this could be 
done better  with a currency  board  or a flexible exchange rate, but they 
have little doubt  that inflation  can be stopped  without  major  costs. The 
task at hand is simply to bring about a credible regime change. 
In the discussion of Mexico it has been suggested that central  bank 
policy was the reason for the collapse; specifically, sterilizing reserve 
losses  supplemented by credit creation on the part of development 
banks. Accordingly, a different monetary  policy could have avoided 
the collapse. This is not apparent.  Credit creation did indeed help to 
promote  reserve  losses and  precipitate  a crisis that  otherwise  might  have 
come later. But if sterilization  had  not taken  place, and  the development 
banks had contained  their lending, Mexican interest  rates would have 
been far higher, growth would have stalled, or there might have been 
a recession. Bankruptcies  would have been  pervasive,  loan  losses would 
have been larger, and politics would have been even more uncertain. 
There  is no evidence that deflation  is achieved quickly and painlessly, 
as Argentina  is starting  to demonstrate.  It is difficult  to believe that  the 
level of wages and prices would have declined rapidly  to yield com- 
petitiveness. The exchange rate might well have lasted longer, maybe 
even a whole year. But there is absolutely no indication  that policies 
that  did not work in Europe  could have worked  in Mexico. In sum, the 
Bank of Mexico merely helped to bring about  the collapse earlier  than 
might otherwise have happened. The problem, then, is not monetary 
policy but incomes policy or, more broadly, the context in which dis- 
inflation  takes place. 
In this there lies a genuine predicament,  for bringing  down inflation 
requires  taking a stand and imposing a change in expectations  by ac- 
cepting slow growth and unemployment,  making clear the resolve to 
hold to this regime. The temptation  to use the exchange rate to obtain 
early results on disinflation without much unemployment  is  all too 
obvious as a shortcut, but the results are often illusory. After the col- 
lapse, inflation  will be higher than it was at the outset. 
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reasonably  stable inflation  is probably  the best that most countries  can 
achieve in the short  run. Some countries  that  have experienced  extreme 
inflation  may have the political support  to achieve much more;  Argen- 
tina is a case in point. But most, and definitely those countries with 
weak political systems, ought to settle for less than German  inflation 
performance;  they should reinforce  reform, restructuring,  and growth, 
and  seek a very gradual  disinflation.  Chile has been admirably  success- 
ful at this over the past decade.34 
Can Devaluation Work? 
It is commonly held that devaluation  is not a remedy  for overvalua- 
tion; that the real exchange rate is simply not a policy instrument. 
Devaluation, it is  argued, cannot succeed because it would merely 
translate  into a rapid  and substantially  matching  increase  in the level of 
prices. This is the view of monetarists, and also of adherents  to the 
classical approach.  There is no doubt that there are instances  where it 
is mostly true; for example, Argentina. But few countries reach that 
level of exchange rate  disillusion. In most cases a large nominal  deval- 
uation  implies a lasting real depreciation,  the more so as other macro- 
economic policy instruments  avoid creating  a boom.35  A separate  issue 
is whether a real depreciation can help net exports. Here, too,  the 
evidence is positive.36 
In almost all of the European  cases discussed above, nominal  deval- 
uation  has meant  real depreciation.  As table 14 shows, in each instance 
the external sector has responded  rapidly and strongly to the real de- 
preciation  and  has become a source  of growth. Granted  a real deprecia- 
tion can only be successful in a situation where there is room for 
crowding-in.  At full employment,  without  an offsetting  fall in domestic 
demand,  it cannot  do any good. But in a recession it can help, certainly 
as the counterpart  of a fiscal contraction.  Those European  countries  that 
34.  See Dornbusch  and Edwards  (1994) and Dornbusch  and Fischer  (1993) on this 
point. 
35.  Mussa  (1986) and  Obstfeld  (1995) review the effect of nominal  on real  exchange 
rates. 
36.  See appendix  B, below, for a more  detailed  discussion  of the trade  responses  to 
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Table  14. Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom:  Exchange  Rate Depreciation  and the 
Trade  Balance 
Units  as indicated 
Nominal  Real 
exchange  rate  exchange  rate 
depreciationa  depreciationb  Trade  balancec 
1990-92  1993-94  1990-92  1993-94  1990-92  1993-94 
Italy  0.1  19.1  -  5.6  15.4  1.4  34.2 
Spain  -4.5  17.1  1.7  16.8  -30.4  -15.5 
United  Kingdom  2.5  7.8  -2.5  7.1  -24.8  -18.1 
Source: Data for exchange rate depreciations are from Intterniationial Financial Statistics; and for the trade balance, from 
OECD Economic Outlook. 
a. Percentage change in nominal multilateral exchange rate over period indicated. 
b. Percentage change in real effective  exchange rate over period indicated. Depreciation shown as positive change. 
c.  Billions of U.S.  dollars for period indicated. 
devalued in 1992 still experience a positive growth contribution  from 
the external  sector in 1995, unlike France, for example, which did not. 
Surprisingly, the European  experience failed to reveal almost any 
inflationary  response to devaluation.  In every country, inflation  barely 
responded even though double-digit  devaluation had taken place. 
Clearly, as economies recover  and  come to realize their  full productive 
capacity, inflation returns. But that is not the same as arguing that 
devaluation,  per se, is inflationary. 
The more extreme cases reviewed above also involved a large real 
depreciation  and a resulting  strong  gain in net exports. The fact that in 
each case there was a deep recession and that, therefore, the trade 
changes reflected  both the real exchange rate and the cyclical position 
should not cast doubt on this. Specifically, the boost in net exports 
served as the shock absorber  early in the crisis and was the means by 
which the economy started  turning  upward.  Subsequently,  as domestic 
demand  recovered, the sharp initial improvement  in net exports was 
dampened. 
In the Mexican  case that  process is currently  under  way. Net exports 
have improved  dramatically,  again  partly  as a result  of the deep depres- 
sion of demand. In fact, net exports are the only growing component 
of demand  at this time. Ultimately  the growth  will spill over  to domestic 
demand,  but even so, at full employment  the economy will have higher 
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Are Capital Markets Guilty? 
In many  interpretations  of currency  collapses, capital  flows were the 
principal  drivers:  opening  to international  capital  brought  the flows that 
appreciated  the currency,  the current  account  adjusted,  the money left, 
and the system crashed. Certainly  it takes both a misaligned  exchange 
rate and ready financing to produce the resulting imbalances. A cur- 
rency collapse cannot happen without the capital flows. Yet it is not 
likely that policymakers will  suddenly, one day, decide to give in, 
unless the situation  has deteriorated.  A more plausible scenario  is that 
a certain  set of events change the economic outlook, and markets  react 
by assessing that  changed  outlook, force an increase  in the interest  rate, 
and hence change the situation with which policymakers  must work. 
That is a far cry from saying that markets  will cause a collapse when 
there is no problem. 
In assessing whether  capital markets  can be restrained  so that they 
can no longer bring down currencies, there are two separate  issues to 
consider. First, without  significant  capital  flows it would be impossible 
to build up a large external deficit. Thus capital markets  are certainly 
partners  in a collapse. Second, if capital markets  can, in fact, bring 
about  a collapse and  its attendant  costs for no external  reason, then  they 
are  clearly  counterproductive  and  deserve  restraint.  If, by contrast,  they 
bring  down currencies  and  policy packages  that  are  unsustainable,  then 
they deserve three cheers. 
It is not surprising  that  the policymakers  for countries  whose curren- 
cies have collapsed  favor  the view that  markets  are  frivolous, force high 
interest rates that complicate economic management,  limit the scope 
for growth without inflation, and in the end, force traumatic  devalua- 
tions for no apparent  reason. Such an explanation  has been offered for 
the EMS collapses: that although  nothing was wrong, the markets  de- 
cided  to stage an attack,  and  once attacked,  it was hard  for policymakers 
not to succumb.37  A policy of holding  up interest  rates  at extreme  levels 
can only be sustained for so long before it becomes a problem in its 
own right, by creating  recession or severe fiscal difficulties. The alter- 
37.  Eichengreen  and Wyplosz (1993) investigate an interpretation  that views the 
EMS collapses as the result of unnecessary  speculative attacks. Their favored policy 
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native view, which is reinforced  by the lasting large real depreciation 
that  follows an attack, is that  the attacker  must  have been right  and  that 
the victim had defended a lost cause for too long, at great social cost. 
In the extreme cases of collapse reported  above, for example, the 
most recent Mexican episode or that of Finland, it is apparent  that the 
policymakers  were wrong to overvalue the currency. Their strategies 
were not persuasive;  it would have taken a very long period  indeed for 
deflation  to restore competitiveness and growth, in comparison  to the 
relatively mild remedy of devaluation. It is hard to see why capital 
markets  should take the blame for bringing  down these policies. 
No doubt the debate will continue on whether capital markets  did 
stage successful raids on perfectly reasonable  currency  strategies.  One 
way to judge the merits of a capital control plan is to ask if it would 
really  have been beneficial  for Finland,  Mexico, or the United  Kingdom 
to hold fast to its nominal exchange rate. It is difficult to make this 
case. There may well be instances where the nominal  exchange rate is 
plausible, if interest rates are not too high; and interest  rates will not 
be too high if capital markets cannot challenge the exchange rate 
freely.38  None of the major collapses reported  above is associated in 
any way with an unwarranted  attack. 
Open Issues 
This paper  has argued  that real exchange rates are a key price in the 
economy, and  that  mismanagement,  if carried  on for too long, can turn 
into a very bad experience. It has interpreted  real exchange rates as 
policy variables:  the nominal rate can be manipulated  and thus, in the 
presence of exchange rate illusion or an initial disequilibrium,  real 
exchange rates are policy instruments.  In conclusion, it looks at two 
issues in the making. One is the growth comparison  of Mexico and 
Chile, with a view to asking whether  Mexico is overvaluing  yet again. 
The other  is a comparison  of Brazil and Argentina,  both countries  with 
overvalued  currencies, but with very different  prescriptions  for reme- 
dying the situation. 
38.  See Obstfeld  (1994) for a recent  evaluation  of the theory  of speculative  attacks. Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  257 
Table  15. Chile and Mexico: Growth and Inflation 
Units  as indicated 
Chile  Mexico 
Indicator  1982-86  1987-95  1982-86  1987-95 
GDP  growtha  -1.8  5.4  -2.6  0.7 
Inflationb  21  17  74  43 
Source: Intertaitiotnal  Financial Statistics. 
a. Annual average percent per year. 
b. Annual average percentage change in CPI. 
Mexico and Chile 
In the early 1980s the currencies  of both Mexico and Chile crashed. 
Since then, these countries have evolved very differently. In Chile 
stabilization  and  reform  translated  into sustained  high growth. In terms 
of inflation,  although  Chile's performance  was not stellar, it raised  little 
concern. In Mexico, as can be seen from table 15 and figure  5, growth 
was low and  inflation  was no better.  Where  lies the difference  and  what 
is the lesson for Mexico? 
It might be tempting  to see the explanation  in political terms. Until 
1988 Chile had a repressive  regime; Mexico more closely resembled  a 
democracy.  But neither  was fully democratic  in the 1980s, and  Mexico 
still is not today. More  likely, the difference  lies in the fact that  Mexico 
has followed a statist-paternalistic  economic strategy,  with an incomes 
policy always close at hand. Chile, by contrast, has used an individu- 
alist Chicago school model, emphasizing  business opportunities,  com- 
petitiveness, and growth. Clearly, the Chilean  model has won out, and 
without  necessarily incurring  significantly  more hardship  than  Mexico 
in the process. 
Another  possibility is that  Chile has a far better  resource  endowment 
than Mexico.  That is  hardly plausible, except in respect to human 
capital. But if it is the case, Mexico is to be blamed  for not doing much, 
if anything, to develop its resource  base. 
The real difference in growth performance  lies in the behavior of 
wages adjusted  for productivity:  in Mexico real wages rose sharply, in 
Chile they did not. Figure  6 helps to make an important  point about  the 
real exchange rate in relation to productivity. It is well known from 
trade  theory  that  a country  with higher  productivity  growth  in tradables 
than the rest of the world will experience increases in the price of its 258  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 5. Chile and Mexico:  Per Capita GDP, 1975-95 
Index, 1980= 100 
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Source: Itntert-1Catiotnal  Financial Statistics. 
nontradables  and  hence, real appreciations,  if measured  by relative  CPI 
or GDP deflator.  This is the familiar  Samuelson-Balassa  effect. It is the 
reason why relative CPIs are poor guides to competitiveness. But the 
real exchange rate measured by relative WPI (basically, tradables) 
would not rise. Specifically, to say that the relative level of wholesale 
prices has risen but so has productivity  is simply an error  of counting; 
any benefits  resulting  from productivity  growth  are already  reflected  in 
prices. Nor would wages adjusted  for productivity  increase. Reliable 
economywide  estimates of productivity  growth  for Chile and for Mex- 
ico are not available. For that reason, in figure 6 we scale wages in 
dollars by an index of per capita GDP to arrive  at a rough measure  of 
adjusted  wages in dollars. Mexico shows real appreciation  and Chile 
does not. Not surprisingly,  the wage strategies  of the pacto are one of 
the reasons for the loss of growth in Mexico. Recourse  to an incomes 
policy sustains wages and pushes them up, at least in time for the 
elections. Moreover, unemployment  is pervasive because for the past 
fifteen years growth has been less than the growth rate of the labor Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  259 
Figure 6. Chile and Mexico: Unit Labor Cost Index, 1975_94a 
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Source-.  Data for GDP, population, and exchange rates are from Ititertiatiotial  Finianicial  Statistics, for nominal wages in 
Chile from Banco Central de Chile ( 1989),  and in Mexico,  from unpublished data from the Banco de M6xico. 
a. The unit labor cost index is nominal wages divided by the exchange rate, all divided by per capita GDP. 
force. In Chile, by contrast, the emphasis has been on a competitive 
exchange rate and high employment. The Chilean strategy  has taken 
the economy gradually to full employment as well as significant in- 
creases in dollar wages, compared  to 1980. 
Reform, restructuring,  the opening of trade, stabilization, privati- 
zation, and openness to capital are all features  that Mexico and Chile 
have in common. The critical difference lies in the fact that in Chile 
the real  exchange  rate  is the key price for long-term  performance,  while 
in Mexico it is the primary  variable to be manipulated  for short-term 
gain. 
In the aftermath  of the recent crash, Mexico has been in a rush to 
restore access to international  capital markets.  It was thought  that the 
best way to achieve this was by means of a strong  and stable exchange 
rate. After the initial collapse, the peso was allowed to fall to 6 pesos 
to the dollar, and it was the intention  to keep it at that level until the 260  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
end of the year. Yet prices have increased significantly  over the first 
six months  of 1995, and thus, despite the weak dollar, the real depre- 
ciation amounts  to only 35 percent. By the end of 1995, with inflation 
continuing at 2 percent per month, there will have been only a very 
minor real depreciation. Is Mexico doing it again? Granted  there are 
purchasing  power parity (PPP) calculations to show undervaluation, 
and it can be argued  that wages have increased  very little, at least, so 
far. But the right issues to focus on are growth and financial  stability. 
The overriding  impression  is that  the country  is not focusing on export- 
led growth. 
Brazil and Argentina 
Argentina,  with its currency  board  scheme, and Brazil, without  any 
clearly defined currency scheme, present examples of  situations in 
which events have not yet run their full course. Both countries have 
currencies  that are strongly  appreciated  in real terms. In each case, the 
question is whether there is an overvaluation, and if so,  what to do 
about  it. We believe that  Brazil should  devalue as part  of a comprehen- 
sive stabilization  program,  while Argentina  should hold out and foster 
deflation. The reason for this eclectic recommendation  is that Argen- 
tina, perhaps  more than any other country, has abandoned  any form of 
exchange rate illusion. 
BRAZIL.  Brazil has a long tradition  of not allowing its exchange  rate 
policy and  external  balance  constraints  to become an  obstacle  to growth. 
Lack of  a serious macroeconomic policy has, over time, taken the 
country  to hyperinflation.  Since 1985, a few stabilizations  have made 
temporary  inroads, but have never come to grips with the problem 
because there has never been sufficient  disillusion to support  a radical 
change in regime. 
The most recent stabilization, the Real Plan, was implemented  in 
July 1994. This was an ingenious scheme of changing numeraires.  In 
March  1994 nominal  prices, wages and  other  contracts  were allowed to 
be quoted in a unified reference value (URV) that would be replaced 
by a new currency,  the real, on July 1, 1994. Since prices were already 
indexed  to several different  references, the innovation  of the URV was 
to coordinate  a unified  unit  of account  that  would substitute  for all other 
indexation  mechanisms. In the interim  period after  the introduction  of Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  261 
Figure 7. Brazil: Real Exchange  Rate, 1975_95a 
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Source: Data obtained directly from the J. P. Morgan currency index database. 
a. Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices. 
the URV and before its replacement  by the real, it was expected that 
relative prices would converge to their equilibrium  value. This was 
important  to the second phase of the conversion, when the URV would 
be transformed  into real on a one-to-one basis and then pegged to the 
dollar. This pegging, in fact, caused monthly inflation  rates to plunge 
from 46 percent  in June 1994 to 1.5 percent  in September  1994. Over 
the past months  moderate  inflation  has continued,  despite an immediate 
stabilization  boom. 
As part  of the stabilization,  the government  initially  allowed nominal 
appreciation,  even though  inflation  continued  at an annual  rate  of 25 to 
30 percent. As a result, in July 1995 the cumulative  real appreciation 
since June 1994, shown in figure 7, amounted  to 15 percent. This real 
appreciation  is potentially  problematic  because Brazil, like other  cases 
discussed above, has already undergone a trade reform and plans to 
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Table  16. Brazil: Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1992-95 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1992  1993  1994  1995 
GDP  growtha  -0.8  4.1  5.7  5.0 
Inflationb  1156.4  2828.7  1238.1  18.8 
Budget  surplusc  -  2.8  - 1.3  0.6  - 2.2 
Trade  balanced  4.0  3.0  1.8  -1.7 
Real  exchange  ratec  73.1  82.1  94.1  101.9 
Source: Data for growth and the budget surplus are from Banco Central do Brasil (1995); for inflation, from internzational 
Financial Statistics; for the trade balance, from Banco Central do Brasil (I1995)  and ltlernzationial  Financial Statistics; and 
for the real exchange rate, directly from the J. P. Morgan currency index database. 
a. Percent per year. For 1995, estimate by Banco Central do Brasil. 
b. December-to-December percentage change in CPI. For 1995, first quarter  annualized. 
c.  Percent of GDP. Operational surplus (primary balance less real interest payments). For 1995, January  annualized. 
d. Percent of GDP. For 1995, first quarter annualized. 
e.  Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices,  1990 =  100. For 1995, first six months. 
future. Since trade  liberalization,  restructuring,  and budget  cutting all 
involve restraint  on demand,  and since an aggressively  priced  currency 
does not go well with low interest  rates, there  is a crowding-in  problem 
in the making. Sometime  in the next year  or so, real  depreciation  would 
be desirable. But real depreciation  is a very poor idea if indexation 
linkages remain  significant. The predicament,  then, is that without  the 
other  elements of reform, devaluation  makes no sense. But there is no 
such comprehensive  reform  program  on the horizon. In the meantime, 
overvaluation  and high interest  rates continue. Although  the Brazilian 
authorities,  predictably,  deny that  there  is a problem,  it is useful to ask 
where this situation  might lead.39 
One scenario is that high interest rates will increasingly  become a 
banking  problem. This is beginning to be apparent  in the state banks 
and is incipient in the private banks. The government's  response of 
offering deposit insurance  is not a solution. Once the banking  problem 
has spread  to the extent that it can only be resolved by lower interest 
rates, the basis will set for a speculative  attack, as in some of the cases 
discussed above. 
Table 16 shows some of Brazil's principal  economic indicators.  His- 
torically, Brazil has been substantially inward-looking, and capital 
flight  has not been part  of the financial  tradition.  The indexation  regime 
in capital markets,  in addition  to capital controls, was relatively effec- 
39.  Brazilian  Finance Minister  Malan was recently  quoted  as saying, "Those who 
criticize the exchange rate have a type of short-run  myopia created by another  trade 
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tive in maintaining a domestic capital market. But Brazil has now 
deregulated  and as a result markets  function far more internationally. 
Today capital flight and disinvestment by foreign investors is a real 
possibility in a way that policymakers, accustomed to a tradition  of 
closed finance, do not seem to recognize. 
Once a comprehensive program  is set in place, preferably  before 
inflation  turns up once again, real depreciation  could be achieved by 
three  different  methods:  a devaluation,  a fast crawl, or a float. It is not 
apparent  that one strategy  has any compelling advantage  over another. 
The chief issue is to accomplish the task in hand. 
ARGENTINA.  Over the past twenty years, Argentina so thoroughly 
debased  its currency  that  seigniorage  became  a source  of hyperinflation; 
the only way to protect  money was to move it offshore. Although  Brazil 
also experienced  hyperinflation,  it did not seem to raise concern. Dol- 
larization  was an altogether  remote concept; as has been seen, stabili- 
zation was eventually achieved around  a unit of account. By contrast, 
when  Argentina  last stabilized, in April  of 1991, it moved  to an extreme 
monetary  standard:  the currency  board. Just as at the end of the nine- 
teenth century, when Argentina first experimented with a currency 
board, nothing short of a fully institutionalized  mechanism  of money 
issue could begin to yield credibility. The monetary  regime is simple: 
the currency is fixed at one-to-one to the dollar; dollars and pesos 
circulate and are offered as deposits in parallel; and money creation 
must be fully backed by increases in foreign exchange reserves, and 
vice versa. Argentina  is on a rigorous  dollar standard  and has, in fact, 
stuck to it against all temptations. 
From an initial situation of hyperinflation,  stabilization led to an 
immediate  drop to almost zero inflation, in terms of consumer  prices. 
In terms of wholesale prices the disinflation  was quite rapid, but even 
so a real appreciation  accumulated  in the early months  of the program 
and still remains, as seen in figure 8. This real appreciation  is proble- 
matic  because trade  liberalization,  restructuring,  and  budget  cutting  all 
involve a major  reduction  in labor demand. Even though  growth  aver- 
aged 7.7 percent over the past four years, the unemployment  rate has 
risen to 18.6 percent and keeps rising. There is no question that the 
country  would benefit  from lower interest  rates and  a more  competitive 
exchange rate, but devaluation is not the way to accomplish this in 
Argentina. 264  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 8. Argentina:  Wholesale  Price Index in U.S. Dollars 
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Argentina  is so fully dollarized that the dollar is the means of pay- 
ment;  if the peso goes, Argentina  will stay with the dollar. Already  55 
percent of deposits are in dollars, and likewise currency  holdings are 
significantly  dollarized. But beyond that, the dollar is also the unit of 
account and the reference point. As long as the peso stands  at one-to- 
one with the dollar, any attempt  to shake the relationship  would surely 
demonstrate  that, to all intents and purposes, Argentina is a dollar 
country. There is no exchange rate illusion. 
Therefore  Argentina will have to recover competitiveness through 
deflation.  That  is how the gold standard  used to work. Table 17 presents 
the economic picture of Argentina. Not surprisingly, there has been 
very little evidence of deflation so far, since the economy was until 
recently in a boom. Yet even during this boom period, inflation in 
dollars came down below 5 percent. The next step is to bring down 
wages and prices. While Brazil was booming and overvaluing  its cur- 
rency, the problems  of Argentina,  which  relies importantly  on its export Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  265 
Table  17.  Argentina:  Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1990-95 
Units  as indicated 
Indicator  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995a 
GDP  growthb  1.0  8.9  8.7  6.0  7.1  2.6 
Inflatione  2314.0  171.7  24.9  10.6  4.2  4.9 
Trade  balanced  6.  1  2.0  -1  .2  -1.4  -2.1  -1.7 
Real  interest  ratec  24.1  -0.5  13.2  9.0  4.7  7.9 
Real  exchange  rate'  100.0  83.1  84.6  83.4  86.1  88.5 
Source: Data for growth and the trade balance are from Republic of Argentina (various years); for inflation, GDP, and 
interest rates, from ltiternzational  Finianc-ial  Statistics; and for exchange rates, directly from the J. P. Morgan  currency index 
database. 
a. First quarter, annualized. 
b. Percent per year. 
c.  Annual percentage change in CPI. 
d. Percent of GDP. 
e.  Deposit rate less WPI inflation. 
f.  Effective exchange rate index based on nonfood wholesale prices,  1990  =  100. 
trade  with Brazil, were smaller.  Now, with a slowdown  and  the prospect 
of real depreciation  in Brazil, Argentina's need for deflation is much 
larger. The government has begun moving in that direction. It has 
actually secured congressional approval  for a 20 percent  cut in public 
sector wages. In the private sector, though, downward  stickiness re- 
mains the rule. Presumably  it will take a severe slowdown to lower 
private  sector  wages; it is becoming  quite apparent  that  this will happen. 
Deflation,  however, carries  its own complications.  While it may well 
restore  competitiveness, a fall of prices redistributes  debt burdens  and 
will widen bankruptcy  problems in a system that already has severe 
banking  difficulties. Admittedly, devaluation  would be just as compli- 
cated because of the mismatching  of balance sheets. Thus there is no 
way to top off reform and stabilization  with a quick and easy drop in 
prices. 
Argentina  bears  watching  for two reasons. First, the present  situation 
makes  it clear  that  a currency  board  is no panacea  for failing credibility. 
Doubts persist for years, and real exchange rate issues do not go away 
easily. In fact, the Mexican  crisis of 1994 in turn  threw  the international 
spotlight  on Argentina;  next, the March 1995 elections resulted  in sig- 
nificant  capital  flight;  and  since then, in one way or another,  the country 
has been on probation in international  markets. Second, a currency 
board  does not resolve the issue of an equilibrium  real exchange rate. 
The emphasis is shifted to deflation, and there is very little evidence 
that this mechanism  is any easier than a successful real depreciation. 266  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
Having mismanaged  its money for decades, Argentina  has no alterna- 
tive to the most rigorous, most institutionalized  monetary  regime, with 
an accompanying  experiment  in deflation. 
APPENDIX  A 
Selected Currency  Appreciation  Experiences 
THIS  APPENDIX reviews several appreciation  experiences after 1975 in 
order to verify the propositions  that all major currency  appreciations 
have ended with a significant  exchange devaluation  (with or without  a 
speculative  attack), a fast crawling  peg, or floating  of the currency,  and 
that  no recent  experience  of appreciation  with a fixed exchange  rate  has 
involved resorting  to deflation  or inflation  to restore  equilibrium.  The 
information  is compiled  from  the  J. P. Morgan  currency  index  database. 
Appreciations  are defined as accumulated  movements  of the exchange 
of at least 15 percent  that lasted more than  one year and less than five. 
IMF classifications of exchange rate arrangements  are taken from In- 
ternational Financial  Statistics.40 
Argentina, 1978-83.  The real exchange rate (RER) appreciated  by 
more than 60 percent during the period 1979-80.  During 1981-83  it 
returned  smoothly  to its preappreciation  level. As of June 1982 the IMF 
classified the Argentinian  currency  regime as "other types." The real 
depreciation  was obtained through nominal changes in the exchange 
rate. 
Australia, 1987-92.  The RER appreciated  by 21 percent between 
1987 and 1989. Between 1990 and 1992 it returned  smoothly  to its pre- 
appreciation  level. Throughout  this period Australia  had a floating  ex- 
change rate regime. 
Brazil, 1987-90.  The cumulative appreciation  between 1987 and 
1990 was almost 54 percent. This period was characterized  by a slow 
crawling  peg system. The floating of the currency  in October  and No- 
vember 1990 ended the appreciation. 
40.  For  experiences  before 1975 that  ended in collapses, see Edwards  (1989). Note 
also that the J. P. Morgan  database  does not include Israel. Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  267 
Colombia, 1979-85.  The appreciation  during 1979-83  totaled 27 
percent.  During 1983-85 the RER  depreciated  smoothly  by 37 percent. 
This was achieved by means of a crawling  peg system. 
Indonesia, 1979-83.  The RER appreciated  by 31 percent  during  the 
period 1979-82.  In March 1983 a nominal depreciation  of 25 percent 
restored  it to its preappreciation  level. The currency  regime during  the 
appreciation  was a managed  floating system. 
Malaysia, 1981-86.  The RER appreciated  by 20 percent during 
1981-84. Between August 1985 and  October  1986 it fell below its 1981 
level. From March 1984 the currency was pegged to a composite of 
currencies. 
New Zealand, 1985-91.  Between 1985 and 1988 the RER appreci- 
ated by 32 percent. Between 1989 and 1991 it depreciated  by 13 per- 
cent. Throughout  this period the currency  floated  freely. 
Nigeria, 1982-86.  The RER appreciated  by 66 percent during the 
period 1982-84.  After a smooth depreciation  during 1985-86,  a nom- 
inal depreciation  of 66 percent in October 1986 left it well below its 
preappreciation  level. 
The Philippines,  1983-86.  The RER appreciated by 20 percent be- 
tween 1983 and 1985. It returned  to preappreciation  levels through  an 
initially smooth depreciation  in 1985, followed by a 10 percent  deval- 
uation in January  1986. During this period the exchange rate regime 
evolved from a managed  to a freely floating system. 
South  Africa, 1977-84.  The RER  appreciated  by 57 percent  between 
1977 and 1980. Between October 1983 and October 1984 it almost 
returned  to its preappreciation  level. The currency  floated  freely during 
1977-84. 
Taiwan, 1978-83.  The RER  appreciated  by 28 percent  between 1978 
and 1981. Between mid-1981 and 1983 it depreciated  by 10 percent. 
Turkey,  1976-80.  Between 1976 and 1979 the RER appreciated  by 
57 percent. Nominal depreciations  in January  and February  1980 de- 
valued it by 30 percent. The IMF did not classify Turkey  as a pegging 
country. 
Venezuela, 1979-84.  The RER appreciated  by 35 percent  between 
1979 and 1983. It recovered through devaluations in February  and 
March  of 1984 totaling  43 percent.  Throughout  this period  the currency 
was linked to the U.S.  dollar. 268  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
APPENDIX  B 
Trade  Elasticities, Devaluation, and Trade 
THIS  APPENDIX  addresses the issue of the impact of a devaluation  on 
aggregate demand, focusing on the case of Mexico. First, different 
estimations  of the trade  elasticities are presented.  From  the average  of 
these elasticities, the impact of a devaluation  on trade and aggregate 
demand is then calculated, for both the short run and the long run. 
Table B 1 presents  the average  of elasticities weighted against  the rela- 
tive value of imports  in 1985 for each of the estimations. 
Sweder van Wijnbergen  presents  estimations  of demand  for imports 
and exports as part of a macroeconomic  model for the Mexican econ- 
omy.4' This study uses annual  data covering the period 1970-87,  and 
the estimation of imports is disaggregated  into consumption,  capital, 
and intermediary  goods. The explanatory variables for imports are: 
relative  price, measured  as import  price over the respective  GNP defla- 
tor (current  and lagged); an indicator  for quantitative  restrictions;  and 
an indicator  of activity (investment  for capital  goods, private  consump- 
tion for consumption goods, and GDP for intermediate  goods). The 
study presents estimations for both export demand and supply. The 
demand  for exports is assumed  to depend  on the relative  price (current 
and lagged) of Mexican exports with respect to an aggregate dollar- 
based price index of the imports of the trade partner.  The supply is 
assumed to depend only on the relative price (current  and lagged), 
proxied by the ratio of the price of exports to the GNP deflator. An 
important  aspect of the results is the high price elasticity of the demand 
for exports (-0.95  in the short run and -  1.07 in the long run). This 
drives the negative exports-revenue  elasticity.42 
Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner  use Mexican quarterly 
data  from the first  quarter  of 1984 to the second quarter  of 1993.43 This 
study assumes a partial  adjustment  process for imports,  using dummies 
41.  van Wijnbergen  (1990). 
42.  Log changes in the price of exports  (dP) and volume of exports  (dX), given an 
initial  change  of exports  dX, (as might  be produced  by a devaluation),  are calculated  as 
follows. By definition, given a supply change dX0,,  we have E1dP =  dX and E,dP = 
(dX -  dX,), where  Ed and Es are the demand  and supply price elasticity, respectively. 
Solving both equations  simultaneously  yields the total change in volume and price. 
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Table  B1. Impact of Real Devaluations  on TRade 
Import  elasticilya  Export  elasticitya 
Volumel  Volumel  Volumel  Pricel  Revenuel 
exchange  income  exhange  exchange  exchange 
Estimation  rate  rate  rate  rate 
van Wijnbergen 
Short-run  -0.81  2.38  0.11  -0.11  -0.02 
Long-run  -1.01  2.38  0.40  -0.37  -0.12 
Dombusch  and  Werner 
Short-run  -0.30  1.25  0.31  -0.46  -0.16 
Long-run  -0.63  2.60  0.91  -0.58  0.28 
Haque,  Lahiri,  and  Montiel 
Short-run  -0.16  0.08  0.05  ...  0.05 
Long-run  -0.94  1.12  0.67  . .  .  0.67 
Kumar,  Samiei, and  Bassett 
Western  hemisphere  -0.50  0.77  0.17  -0.03  0.13 
Benchmark 
Short-run  -0.44  1.12  0.16  -0.15  -0.01 
Long-run  -0.77  1.72  0.54  -0.25  0.16 
Source: Authors' calculations  based on van Wijnbergen (1990),  Dornbusch and Werner (1994),  Haque, Lahiri, and 
Montiel (1990),  and Kumar, Samiei, and Bassett (1993). 
a. Calculated as log changes. 
for changes in trade regimes, GDP as the activity index, and the real 
exchange rate (the U.S. WPI over the Mexican CPI) as the price vari- 
able. For exports, it estimates both supply and demand  functions. The 
supply  function  is assumed  to depend  on the RER and  the local activity 
level (following a partial adjustment  model). The demand  function is 
assumed to depend on the relative price of Mexican exports (in U.S. 
dollars) and total U.S.  imports. 
Nadeem  Haque, Kajal  Lahiri,  and  Peter  Montiel  estimate  a complete 
macroeconomic  model using a panel of countries (including Mexico) 
with annual  data  covering  the period 1963-87.44  The model  has general- 
equilibrium  features and it is estimated  by nonlinear  three-stage  least 
squares.  This study assumes that imports  depend  on the real exchange 
rate, the level of activity, and  the reserves-to-imports  ratio  (that  proxies 
for import  restrictions).  It also assumes  partial  adjustment.  Exports  are 
assumed  to depend on the RER and the level of activity abroad,  and to 
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follow partial  adjustment.  Contrary  to the two previous studies, coun- 
tries are assumed  to be price takers. 
Manmohan  Kumar,  Hossein Samiei, and Sheila Bassett, in an IMF 
Staff Study, estimate trade elasticities as part of  a macroeconomic 
model including  annual  data  covering  the period 1973-91.4  Estimation 
is carried  on a set of countries, and the presented  results are weighted 
averages (by GDP) for subsets of these countries. This appendix  uses 
the estimations  for the western  hemisphere.  Imports  (nonoil) are  a com- 
posite of  desired imports and restricted imports, when the ratio of 
reserves  to imports  is low. Actual imports  are a function  of real export 
earnings,  expenditure  in home goods, relative  prices, and  the reserves- 
to-import  ratio. The model considers both demand  and supply for ex- 
ports.  The structural  model includes  the relative  price  (export  price  over 
world export price) and world income as the determinants  of demand, 
and  relative  price (export  price over domestic  price  of nontraded  goods) 
and capital stock as the determinants  of supply. The study estimates a 
reduced form of export volume and export price, from which it is 
straightforward  to derive the effects of a devaluation. 
The benchmark  case is the average  of the elasticities of the preceding 
four  studies  described  above. With  these elasticities it is straightforward 
to calculate  the impact  of a given devaluation  in net exports  and aggre- 
gate demand. 
For Mexico the ratio of imports  to GDP was 28.3 percent in 1994 
and averaged 26.0  percent between 1988 and 1994. Exports, mean- 
while, represented  20.7 percent  of GDP in 1994 and averaged  21.7 in 
the period 1988-94.  Using values of 27 percent for imports and 21 
percent for exports in the benchmark  case, a 20 percent devaluation 
implies the following direct effects: Exports decline in the short run 
(six months)  by 0.04 percentage  point of GDP; exports  increase  by the 
equivalent  of 0.64 percentage  point in the long run;  imports  decline by 
the equivalent  of 2.37 percentage  points in the short  run; and imports 
drop by the equivalent of 4.16 percentage  points of GDP in the long 
run.  These effects total increments  in aggregate  demand  of 2.33 percent 
of GDP in the short  run and 4.80 percent  of GDP in the long run. 
45.  Kumar,  Samiei, and Bassett (1993). Comments 
and Discussion 
Sebastian Edwards: Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  his associates  would  have 
us believe that, as are Anna Karenina's  happy families, all currency 
collapses are alike. Not quite. In fact, Dornbusch,  Ilan Goldfajn, and 
Rodrigo  Valdes have chosen at least two episodes that  clearly stand  out 
as exceptions in the long history of devaluation crises of the world 
economy. Contrary  to the prototypical  devaluation,  neither  the Chilean 
nor  the current  Mexican crisis was preceded  by large fiscal imbalances, 
runaway  credit  creation  for the public sector, an exploding  black  market 
for foreign exchange, or hikes in import  tariffs and exchange controls. 
These episodes are rather  unusual instances of currency  collapse with 
fiscal balance and openness. This, indeed, makes them somewhat  puz- 
zling, and makes their analysis particularly  interesting.  The two other 
crises examined by the authors,  Mexico in 1982 and Finland  in 1994, 
do conform to the broad characteristics  of historical  crises. They are, 
however, quite different from the cases of Chile in 1982 and Mexico 
in 1994. 
This comment focuses on three issues raised by Dornbusch,  Gold- 
fajn, and Valdes. First, I argue  that  not all devaluation  crises are alike. 
This means that better analytical stories than the existing speculative 
attack models are needed to account for differences across episodes. 
Second, I discuss the role of capital inflows in the Chilean and recent 
Mexican crises, and argue that the sudden  surge in capital availability 
played a more important  role than  the authors  allow. Third, I deal with 
their  provocative assertion  that the real exchange rate is a policy vari- 
able. I argue  that this is not a new (revolutionary?)  theory;  the issue is 
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really one of semantics. Also, in discussing whether  the real exchange 
rate is endogenous or exogenous, I address  the question posed by the 
authors:  Can devaluations  work?  I answer  with a very strong  positive. 
I end with some brief remarks  on the selection of exchange  rate  regimes 
in developing and transitional  economies. 
The Anatomy of Devaluation Crises 
What  makes the Chilean and recent  Mexican crises different  is that, 
in terms  of the policies pursued  before  the collapse, they do not conform 
to the historical regularities  first studied by Richard  Cooper in 1971. 
What  they do share with the vast majority  of crises is that the crash is 
preceded  by a substantial  real appreciation  and a large loss, almost a 
complete depletion, of international  reserves. But this is just another 
way of saying that the parity  could not be sustained  and that the fixed 
rate system crashed. The really interesting  question is whether there 
are differences in the policy stance in the period leading to the attack 
on the currency.  Could it have been known, exclusively on the basis of 
credit, monetary,  fiscal, and commercial  policies, that  Chile and Mex- 
ico were inexorably slipping towards a free fall? I believe that the 
answer  to this question is no. 
In an extended study on the anatomy of devaluation  crises in the 
developing world I analyzed, in quite some detail, eighty-seven epi- 
sodes of currency  collapses between 1954 and 1975.1 These crises were 
overwhelmingly  characterized  by major  fiscal imbalances-not  merely 
fiscal loosening-that  were validated  by overly expansive credit poli- 
cies. Not surprisingly, most of the credit creation went to the public 
sector. In spite of the rather  rapid rate of growth of credit creation in 
Mexico documented  by Dornbusch,  Goldfajn, and Valdes, in all other 
respects both Chile and Mexico's macroeconomic  policies were pru- 
dent. (Note that I am already  disagreeing  with the authors,  in that  I do 
not consider the real exchange rate to be strictly a policy variable!)  In 
fact, in both  cases the fiscal accounts  exhibited  comfortable-although, 
in the case of Mexico, admittedly  declining-balances,  and instead  of 
1. See Edwards  (1989) and Edwards  and Santaella  (1993). For similar studies see 
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closing the external sector, both countries  continued  to pursue  aggres- 
sive opening  strategies. 
The fact that the runs  on the Chilean and  Mexican currencies  do not 
conform  to the "inconsistent fiscal policy" norm  means that the stan- 
dard  models of currency  collapse and speculative  attacks, such as Paul 
Krugman's  classic formulation,  cannot satisfactorily  account  for these 
episodes. Guillermo Calvo and Enrique  Mendoza, and Leonardo  Lei- 
derman  and Alfredo Thorne have suggested that models based on en- 
dogenous policy shifts or on the existence of a vulnerable banking 
systems can appropriately  explain the Mexican case. Although these 
formulations  represent an improvement  over the standard  approach, 
they still fall short  of explaining  the role of the massive capital  inflows 
in the period leading up to these crises.2 
Real Exchange Rates, Capital Inflows, and Crises 
Stabilization  programs  based on an exchange rate  anchor  are in dan- 
ger of generating  a significant  degree of real exchange rate overvalua- 
tion, a loss in the degree of international  competitiveness, and very 
large trade  deficits. If this situation  is not corrected  in time, the credi- 
bility of the stabilization  program  will be called into question, inviting 
speculative attacks  on the currency.  This was, indeed, the situation  in 
Chile in 1981-82,  when the combination  of a fixed nominal  exchange 
rate, backward  indexed wages, and a major surge in capital inflows 
generated  an acute overvaluation  that ended in a precipitous  crisis.3 
In 1988-89  independent  analysts, as well as the architects  of the 
Mexican stabilization  program, were clearly aware of the dangers  of 
this overvaluation  syndrome.  In fact, in an  early  analysis  of the Mexican 
program  Dornbusch himself pointed out that the "risk is that when 
inflation  has disappeared  it has been replaced  by a new problem  such 
as exchange rate overvaluation  or bankruptcies."4  The Mexican au- 
thorities, however, argued that there were two reasons why Mexico 
would be exempted from this fate. First, the policy was initiated  in a 
2.  See Krugman  (1979), Calvo and Mendoza (1995), and Leiderman  and Thorne 
(1995). 
3.  See Edwards  and Edwards  (1991). 
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situation  of exchange rate undervaluation;  that is, there was a built-in 
cushion allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate  without hurting 
the country's external position. Second, Mexico had ample interna- 
tional reserves.5  Addressing  the Mexican congress on March  10, 1988, 
Minister  Aspe said that "for the exchange rate to serve [as an anchor] 
it is required  that  the balance  of payments  starts  from  a favorable  surplus 
position.  .  .  . [T]he use of the exchange  rate according to a downward 
tendency  .  .  .  is  fully  justified  if  we  consider  that there is  an ample 
margin  of undervaluation  of our currency."  '6 
The Mexican stabilization program  succeeded in reducing inertia, 
but not in eliminating it. An empirical analysis of the degree of per- 
sistence of the Mexican rate of inflation strongly suggests that even 
after  the renewals  of the  pacto  in 1989-91,  inertia  continued  to be very 
high. As a result, the decline in the rate of inflation was painfully slow.7 
As had been the case in Chile during  the early 1980s, and as many had 
feared for Mexico, the process was accompanied  by a substantial  real 
appreciation  and loss in international  competitiveness. In 1989 a num- 
ber  of observers  expressed  concern  about  the mounting  real  appreciation 
and argued that the trend would become unsustainable  because the 
country  lacked the foreign exchange to finance an increasing  external 
disequilibrium.8  The surge in capital  inflows that  started  in 1990, how- 
ever, relaxed  Mexico's external  constraint,  allowing the country  to run 
extremely large current  account deficits from 1992 to 1994. The fact 
that  these inflows were largely private  persuaded  a number  of analysts, 
including senior Mexican officials, that this was an equilibrium  phe- 
nomenon  that did not call for policy action. 
To the questions of whether  the current  account  deficit was sustain- 
able and  the real  exchange  rate  was overvalued,  the Mexican  authorities 
responded  that to the extent that flows were private and the fiscal ac- 
counts were in surplus, there was nothing to worry about. In January 
1994, the Banco  de Mexico's governor,  Miguel  Mancera,  told the  Econ- 
omist that  the current  account  deficit was not a problem  because  it "was 
5.  Two additional  explanations  were later  added  to this list: that  the NAFTA  would 
provide  enough capital to sustain a more appreciated  real exchange rate, and that pro- 
ductivity  gains would offset the real exchange  rate appreciation  (see Aspe, 1993). 
6.  Cited in Vela (1993, p. 1). 
7.  See Edwards  (1993), and also Santaella  and Vela (1995) and Vela (1993). 
8.  See, for example, Edwards  (1990). Rudiger  Dornbusch, llan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes  275 
associated with the inflow of foreign funds, rather  than expansionary 
fiscal or monetary  policy." And in its 1993 annual  report  the Banco de 
Mexico stated that the "current account deficit has been determined 
exclusively by the private sector's decisions to save and invest.... 
[B]ecause of the above and the solid position of public finances, the 
current  account deficit should clearly not be a cause for undue con- 
cern.  "9 
The increase  in capital inflows, together  with the rigid  exchange  rate 
regime, was the major  cause of the persistent  real exchange  rate  appre- 
ciation after 1989. In fact, the higher capital inflows required a real 
appreciation  of the peso. This is because to the extent that  the increase 
in expenditure  financed by such flows is spent on domestic goods, a 
change  in relative  prices-that  is, a real appreciation-will be required 
to maintain  macroeconomic  equilibrium.  This was, indeed, the case in 
Mexico, where a large proportion  of the increase in expenditure  went 
to the real estate sector. 
In that regard, then, it was possible for the Mexican authorities  to 
argue  that  the real exchange rate appreciation  was an equilibrium  phe- 
nomenon  that  did not require  policy intervention.  )0 However, the prob- 
lem with this argument  is that in Mexico, as in Chile a decade earlier, 
the rate at which capital was flowing into the economy was clearly not 
sustainable  in the long run, nor  even in the medium  run.  Thus  the major 
real appreciation  of  the peso induced by the greater availability of 
foreign financing  was clearly a short-term  phenomenon  that, sooner  or 
later,  would have to be, at least partially,  reversed;  and  in the meantime, 
was hampering  growth  and creating  a serious long-run  macroeconomic 
disequilibrium.  In fact, what the Mexican authorities  missed was that, 
just because the capital flowing in was private, it was susceptible  to a 
sudden stop that would require a massive adjustment  effort. In 1993 
Daniel Oks and Sweder van Wijnbergen  recognized the temporary  na- 
ture  of the expansion  of capital  inflows and  argued  that  the key question 
was: "Once capital  stops flowing, should  we expect the current  account 
to improve or is Mexico heading for a major [balance of payments] 
crisis?' ''' 
9.  The  Economist,  January  22,  1994, p. 21; Banco de M6xico (1993, pp. 179-80). 
10. See, for example, Banco de Mexico (1993, 1994) and  Aspe (1993, pp. 43-46). 
11. Oks and van Wijnbergen  (1995, p.  174). It is worthwhile  noting that  Oks was 276  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
In long-run equilibrium  it is not possible for the ratio of Mexican 
securities  held by foreigners  relative to Mexico's GDP to grow contin- 
uously. In fact, the long run will be characterized  by a stable ratio of 
claims on Mexico to the country's GDP. Given the rate of growth of 
the Mexican  economy in the early 1990s, the sustainable  rate  of capital 
inflows was closer to the 2 to 4 percent  of GDP range  than  the 8 percent 
of GDP observed  during 1992-93.12 
Thus the relevant  question  was not, as many analysts  thought  during 
1994, whether  these inflows were sustainable,  but how and  when Mex- 
ico was going to adjust  toward  a lower availability  of foreign  resources. 
More  precisely, even in early 1993 Mexico's challenge was to engineer 
a smooth landing, adjusting gradually  to a situation of lower capital 
inflows. By mid-1994 this challenge had  become an urgent  imperative. 
The problem  is that whereas  the real exchange  rate  appreciates  without 
any impediments during the surge in inflows, when capital inflows 
decline nominal wage and price rigidity tend to make the required  real 
depreciation  difficult. 
The abandonment  of the predetermined  exchange  rate  regime in late 
1992, and  the adoption  of a managed  floating  regime-or  even a crawl- 
ing peg-would  have increased the credibility of Mexico's trade lib- 
eralization, allowing exports to grow faster and the recession to end. 
Also, and more important,  it would have given the system the gear for 
a smooth landing  once capital inflows started  to decline to their lower, 
equilibrium  level.  An even better strategy would have been a more 
gradual  opening of the capital account-that  would have largely dis- 
couraged  short-term  speculative  flows-combined  with a flexible nom- 
inal rate. However, the government's  determination  to cling to the rigid 
nominal exchange rate system, its insistence-an  obsession, really- 
on attaining  single-digit inflation, and a succession of negative shocks 
made  the possibility of a smooth landing  increasingly  unlikely as 1994 
unfolded. More serious, however, was the fact that after rejecting  ex- 
change rate adjustment  and deciding to maintain  the band system, the 
the World  Bank's country  economist for Mexico at the time, and van Wijnbergen  had 
been the bank's lead economist for Mexico until early 1993. 
12. This condition  for overall sustainability  is an extension  of the well-known  public 
sector sustainability  condition  that calls for maintaining  a constant  ratio of public debt 
to GDP. See Edwards, Steiner, and Losada (1995) for an estimation  of sustainable 
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Mexican authorities  were unwilling to follow the policies required  to 
defend the parity  during 1994. 
The Real Exchange Rate Is Not a Policy Tool 
I must confess that I was quite shocked to read in the introduction 
that the real exchange rate was a policy tool. My concern was prema- 
ture. A careful  reading  of the paper  reveals that  the authors  do not mean 
quite  that. In fact, what  they mean  is that  policymakers  can "influence" 
the real  exchange  rate "through  the setting  of nominal  rates." And they 
qualify their initial statement  by saying that "the real exchange  rate is 
seen to be a limited policy variable." 
My interpretation  of these statements  is that nominal devaluations 
can, and in many cases will, affect the real exchange rate. Moreover, 
the effect can even persist in the medium  and  long runs. I largely agree 
with this view, subject  to some qualifications.  As the existing evidence 
shows, the extent to which a nominal  devaluation  will be translated  into 
a real devaluation  will vary greatly from country to country and will 
depend on a number  of variables. Chief among these, as the authors 
acknowledge, are the country's inflationary  history and the degree of 
currency substitution. Interestingly, however, regression results for 
eleven countries during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s suggest 
that, other things given, even in inflationary  countries as much as 45 
percent  of a nominal  devaluation  translates  into a real  one, on average.  '3 
Unfortunately, in many cases  "other things,"  especially fiscal and 
monetary  policies, are not given. In fact, Latin America's economic 
history is filled with instances when nominal devaluations  have been 
accompanied  by fiscal expansion and surges in credit creation. The 
result has been an unavoidable  outburst  of inflation  followed, sooner 
rather  than later, by a new crisis, a new devaluation,  and a new round 
of recriminations.  Some good examples are Argentina  in 1970, Bolivia 
in  1972 and 1979,  Colombia in  1962 and 1965, Jamaica in  1978, 
Nicaragua  in 1979, Mexico in 1976 and 1982, Peru in 1972, and Ec- 
uador  in 1982. 
The key, and highly valuable, message of this paper  is that  avoiding 
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real exchange rate overvaluation is critical for assuring sustainable 
growth. And this can clearly be achieved more easily with a flexible 
exchange rate regime, be it managed  float or crawling peg. This is, in 
fact, an old lesson, and one that  Carlos  Diaz-Alejandro  was never  tired 
of repeating. The euphoria  of the "emerging markets" era, however, 
has made a few people forget some of the basic lessons of Latin  Amer- 
ica's economic history. A poor memory can, indeed, be costly,  as 
Mexico's recent experience shows. 
Michael Bruno: Rudiger  Dornbusch  is on record  as having predicted 
the collapse of the Mexican peso and has every right to say, "I told 
you so.  I Other  experts, both in Mexico and outside, agreed that the 
peso had  become substantially  overvalued  by 1994 and  that  the Mexican 
government  had  hung  on to it for too long, for political reasons. Mexico 
has had a tradition of pegged exchange rates and, as in the earlier 
episode that the authors  discuss (1978-82),  has found it hard  to move 
away from this regime under changing circumstances.  I concur with 
the authors' "disequilibrum" interpretation  of what recently went 
wrong  with the exchange  rate  peg and  Mexico's macroeconomic  policy. 
But what lesson does this and the earlier episode teach about the 
exchange rate regime? For many observers  it would prove, yet again, 
that  a peg cannot  last forever, not that  it should  never  have been adopted 
in the first place. The authors  go further  than that. They use the two 
Mexican  episodes, that  of Chile in the early 1980s, and  the more  recent 
case of Finland, as well as three more moderate  EMS collapses from 
the 1990s to suggest a policy conclusion that would appear  to be a 
marked  departure  from the paradigm  that has held for the last decade 
or two: that the nominal exchange rate can play a, sometimes central, 
role (together with fiscal discipline) in disinflation. In the authors' 
opinion real exchange rates tend to be sticky downward  and therefore 
it is a mistake  to let them appreciate.  Countries  are ill-advised to allow 
a real appreciation  to continue  for any length  of time because  the current 
account is likely to be of greater concern than inflation as a policy 
target. Moreover, the real exchange rate is a policy variable;  that is, a 
nominal  devaluation  will, in general, lead to a real devaluation  with no 
substantial  inflationary  trade-offs. 
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Of the four points that the paper  emphasizes, I fully agree with two: 
that the real exchange rate is a key relative price, and that an overly 
accommodating  capital market may aggravate  the potential for mis- 
management  and amplify the ultimate  costs of collapse. I am disturbed 
by the other  two points, that  the real exchange  can be viewed as a policy 
variable  and that inflation  has been overemphasized  as a policy target, 
mainly because of the unqualified  interpretation  that can be given to 
these statements. In addition, the authors'  selective choice, and some 
of their interpretations,  of the country  examples are open to question. 
The Real Exchange Rate as a Policy Variable 
To start  with the conditions under  which the real exchange rate can 
be deemed a policy variable, I agree that  the relevant  analytical  frame- 
work is that of the real goods and labor markets.  To simplify matters, 
I first  consider  the real  goods market.  In short-run  equilibrium  and  under 
capital mobility, a clear relationship  must hold between the ratios of 
the following three nominal variables: the nominal exchange rate, E 
(measured  in terms  of domestic currency  per unit of foreign currency), 
the nominal  wage rate, W, and the price level, P.2  Under  these defini- 
tions, the real  exchange  rate  (EIP)  must, ceteris  paribus,  bear  a negative 
relationship to the real wage,  WIP; that is,  real depreciation  and a 
decrease in the real wage necessarily go together. But real exchange 
rate  depreciation  also depends  on real fundamentals,  including  the gov- 
ernment  budget  variables,  S, that  rise with increases  in tax revenue  and 
expenditure  cuts, and other given shift factors, T, that are positively 
related  to increases in the capital stock and total factor  productivity,  as 
well as to a beneficial shift in external  terms  of trade. This commodity 
market  constraint  can be written 
(DI)  EIP  =  F (WIP; S, 7T). 
-  +  + 
At given levels of S and T, a real depreciation  (which increases net 
2.  The role of the money supply (M) is endogenous here on account of capital 
mobility. Under  flexible exchange  rates  M and  MIP would replace  E and  EIP. 280  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
demand  for goods) requires  a fall in the real wage (which increases  net 
supply of goods), and the reverse for a real appreciation. 
Returning  to the paper with this constraint  in mind, suppose that 
balancing  the current  account requires  a real devaluation  (an increase 
in EIP). Although  the authors  do not make this explicit, a central  con- 
dition, based on equation DI,  for a nominal devaluation  to lead to a 
real devaluation  is that there  be a corresponding  drop  in the real wage. 
This can happen  only if there is substantial  unemployment  or if wage 
earners  are under  some kind of money illusion. Only if there were no, 
or little, response by nominal wages to changes in the exchange rate 
and  the price level could the real exchange  rate  be thought  of as a policy 
variable. Even though this might sometimes seem to be the case in the 
short run, when there is unemployment,  it would be very unlikely to 
hold for relatively small and very open economies. In any case, this 
scenario is hardly  likely to persist over time, as wage earners  begin to 
"learn"'  and new devaluations  are implemented  once the old ones have 
run their course at the cost of rising inflation. In other words, it even- 
tually returns  to the situation  in which the existing paradigm  for stabi- 
lization took hold, in the inflationary  years of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 
When to Exit from a Nominal Peg 
It has hitherto  been accepted  that, in general, the real exchange  rate 
can only be altered by a change in real fundamentals,  such as fiscal 
policy or market  structures,  and that in an open economy, certainly a 
small open economy, the nominal exchange rate can often serve as a 
key nominal anchor.3  Obviously pegging the exchange rate in order  to 
stabilize from high or moderate  inflation  involves a calculated  risk. As 
the price level usually is not stabilized completely, the ensuing real 
appreciation  may eventually lead to the overvaluation  of the currency 
and a gradual  worsening of the current  account balance. Unless sus- 
tainable  financing  is assured  for the current  account, sooner or later a 
3.  The following view propounded  in the mid-1980s, albeit in regard  to high infla- 
tion, presumably  would still be advocated  by its author:  "Those who argue  that  budget 
correction  is essential and exchange-rate  fixing redundant  or even counterproductive 
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corrective devaluation  may be called for. However, anticipation  of a 
change in the peg may, under  certain  circumstances,  lead to a currency 
collapse. None of this is news. But it is important  to stress that the 
breathing  space during  which a stabilization  may run its course can be 
quite substantial,  depending  first of all on the real exchange rate at the 
time of the fixing, and no less important,  on the real productivity  div- 
idends that may accrue as a result of disinflation  and competitive  pres- 
sure on the exchange rate. In terms of equation  DI,  the factor T may 
rise endogenously as a result. Because T also affects the current  ac- 
count, this could make for an appreciation  not only of the actual rate, 
but also of the equilibrium  real exchange rate. 
Thus the main question is not whether  stabilization  by means  of the 
exchange  rate  is good or bad  policy, per se, but what  the optimal  timing 
of exit is.  Determining  this is more of an art than an exact science. 
There are plenty of examples of success as well as of failure. The 
authors  mention  none of the successes, yet the failures  that  they cite do 
not necessarily  prove their point. 
Before considering  this, recall that the current  paradigm  for stabili- 
zation took hold during an inflationary  period, several years after the 
breakdown  of Bretton Woods and the age of commodity shocks, and 
was manifested in two distinct groups of countries in two different 
ways. The formation of  the EMS gave traditionally  inflation-prone 
countries, such as France, Italy, and Spain, a way of tying their gov- 
ernments'  hands  by fixing the currency  to the arch-conservative  German 
Bundesbank.  In this way, they eventually  brought  inflation  down  below 
the German  rate. In high-inflation, middle-income countries, on the 
other  hand, the important  link from the exchange  rate  to the price level 
gradually  persuaded  policymakers  to move back to pegged exchange 
rate regimes. Leaving aside phony exchange rate tablitas that ignored 
fundamentals  and ended up in currency  collapse (for example, Chile in 
1979-81 and  Israel  in 1981-83), the main  development  has been to use 
the exchange rate peg as a nominal  anchor, an essential supplement  to 
fiscal retrenchment,  for sharp  stabilization  from high inflation. 
Among the countries  that have recently experienced  high inflation, 
Israel may have been the first to succeed with an exchange rate-based 
stabilization  program,  in 1985.4 The Mexican  pacto of 1988, modeled 
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on the Israeli  example, came next and  was a success, at least until 1990. 
Subsequently,  there were a number  of successful stabilizations  in east- 
ern Europe, for example, Poland  in 1990 and Czechoslovakia  in 1991. 
And there have been quite a few additional  sucesses since. 
It was never thought that if the exchange rate is initially pegged it 
should remain  thus, come what may. The choice of the exchange rate 
as a nominal anchor only relates to the initial phase of stabilization. 
Israel adjusted  its exchange rate in March 1987, twenty months after 
the initial stabilization. Poland and Czechoslovakia also adjusted, in 
due course. In all of these cases, inflation  did come down quickly and 
substantially,  but ongoing residual inflation  led to substantial  real ap- 
preciation. In none of these cases was there a currency  collapse or a 
hard  landing. 
Israel's Experience after the 1985 Stabilization 
The Israeli example is the one that I know best, from personal  ex- 
perience.5  No objective observer  (which I am not) would deny that the 
defense of the initial peg over a period of twenty months (given the 
achievement  of fiscal balance)  had  a profound  impact  on the sustainable 
reduction  of high inflation  from 500 percent  to below 20 percent, and 
more  recently, to below 10 percent  annually.  The first  poststabilization 
realignment  (7 percent)  took place in March  1987 and  would have been 
followed by another limited realignment  exactly a year later, under 
strong  recommendation  from  the Bank  of Israel, had  it not been delayed 
for political reasons  by the minister  of finance, in view of the forthcom- 
ing October 1988 elections. In that respect it was an interesting  fore- 
runner  of the Mexican experience before the 1994 election. The out- 
come, as expected, was a mini-run  on the currency  that, on one bright 
morning  in December 1988, caused a loss of $300 million of reserves 
and necessitated an immediate devaluation  of 5 percent. For lack of 
credibility, this had to be followed by an 8 percent devaluation  very 
shortly afterward. 
those experienced in Europe immediately after both world wars. Among the recent 
exchange-rate  pegging  episodes, Argentina's  stabilization  in 1985, and  Brazil's  in 1986, 
failed mainly for fiscal reasons. 
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Since 1989, Israel has adopted  a more flexible exchange rate policy 
that  amounts  to a crawl: a band (with first 3 percent  and then 5 percent 
on each side) with occasional adjustments  in the mid-rate,  culminating 
at the end of 1991 with a preannounced  crawling  band  that  was recently 
widened  further.  From  the initiation  of the stabilization  program  in July 
1985 to the end of 1988, the shekel appreciated  by about  40 percent  in 
real terms, without  a major  collapse. The initial 2 to 3 percentage  point 
increase  in unemployment  during  the interim  period  (later  followed by 
another  2 percentage  points, to reach 11 percent at the height of the 
Russian immigration)  was the necessary price of making  the stabiliza- 
tion program  credible to the trade  unions and the public at large, and 
bringing  about  the convergence of nominal  wage growth  to the rate of 
inflation. Substantial  overshooting  in the real wage between 1985 and 
1988 (unit  labor  costs increased  by 12 percent)  was followed by a major 
downward  correction  over 1989-92. Going to a more  flexible exchange 
rate any sooner would not have achieved the same result.6 
The Country Examples 
In regard  to the country  examples presented  in the paper,  one would 
have thought  that if currency  collapse is, indeed, an inevitable  conse- 
quence of exchange rate fixing, it would have been easy to come up 
with examples  of collapses that  occured  in the absence  of large  external 
shocks. However, in all of the cases that  the authors  select, such shocks 
either triggered  the collapse or were the prime reason for it. In Chile 
and in Mexico in 1982, the currency  collapsed in the wake of unprec- 
edented hikes in world interest rates. The Finnish currency  collapsed 
along with that of its major trading  partner,  the former Soviet Union 
(that  is, the T factor dropped  sharply,  resulting  in a depreciation  of the 
equilibrium  real rate). Does Finland's  situation  really a prove  that  there 
was anything  wrong with adopting  a fixed peg between 1980 and 1987, 
when it was able to reduce the inflation rate from double digits to 
2.9  percent? Given the rigid Finnish labor markets and inflationary 
6.  Even in the case of Israel, however, my general  caveat might apply  today. Very 
recently  the country  got stuck at a fixed dollar  exchange rate with renewed  real appre- 
ciation and a substantial  increase  in the current  account  deficit that need eventually  to 
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behavioral  norms,  could the country  have achieved  similar  convergence 
by any other means? 
Finally, consider the three EMS examples: Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. It is not clear whether the authors  argue that these 
countries  should never have joined the EMS, or rather,  that some situ- 
ations  require  exchange  rate  realignment  even within  an otherwise  fixed 
exchange rate regime. I would argue that their collapse was caused, 
first  and  foremost, by a shock brought  about  by the unexpected  German 
unification.  Given the German  policy of fiscal expansion  coupled with 
a sharp  monetary  contraction,  there  were only two alternatives  for pre- 
venting the recession from being exported to the rest of Europe:  the 
appreciation  of the deutsche mark  or the depreciation  of some of the 
more vulnerable  currencies.  The relevant  counterfactual  is what would 
have happened in the absence of unification, or with German  fiscal 
retrenchment.  Is it certain that the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy 
would have required  a hard  landing and that the EMS would not have 
survived over a longer period of time? Or, is it correct  to argue, with 
the benefit  of hindsight  in 1995, that these three  countries  should have 
had entirely different exchange rate regimes through 1988? I would 
doubt it. Italy's decision, for example, to join the EMS in 1979 not 
only helped it to bring down inflation faster than it otherwise would 
have, but also, through  the pressures  imposed by real appreciation  on 
the tradable  goods industries, brought about a productivity  increase 
that, in fact, appreciated  the equilibrium real exchange  rate. This inter- 
action parallels  the experience  of Japan,  where an extended  real appre- 
ciation of the yen-to-dollar  rate alongside a surplus  on current  account 
was sustainable  because of rapid  productivity  gains. 
The Lesson of the Recent Mexican Collapse 
What  is the lesson of the recent  Mexican  collapse for other  countries? 
It is not that  the real exchange  rate  should  take  over as a policy variable, 
or that further  reduction of inflation should always be given up once 
moderate  levels have been achieved. Rather,  it is that  the Nigel Lawson 
dictum that only the fisc matters, is wrong. In a world of free capital 
mobility, mistakes  on fundamentals  can be punished  more  quickly. And 
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the authors  rightly argue, as well as its composition  and the term  com- 
position of government  debt. Recent experience  has taught  how impor- 
tant it is to watch for the source of an increase in the current  account 
deficit when assessing the vulnerability  of a country to capital flow 
reversals.  Even if the fisc is in reasonable  shape, which happens  to have 
been the case in Mexico,  an increase in the current account deficit 
generated  by a drop in the private  savings rate is ominous;  an increase 
in investment, especially in tradable  goods industries,  not so. Among 
the Latin  American  economies, Chile stands  out for having  managed  to 
increase  both  private  savings and  investments  during  the period  of large 
capital inflows. It also managed  to continue to reduce inflation  while 
keeping the real exchange rate from appreciating  excessively, because 
its real wages were more downward  flexible. 
This challenging paper  forcefully points out the danger  of overem- 
phasizing the speed of disinflation  convergence at the expense of the 
current account, especially  in the presence of unexpected external 
shocks. The risk involved in following a certain disinflation  strategy 
will vary from one country, or specific situation, to another.  The pres- 
ence of risk, however, does not undermine  the basic premise  on which 
the existing paradigm  has rested. 
General Discussion 
Edmund  Phelps  interpreted  this paper  as differing  markedly  from  one 
that Dornbusch  coauthored  for an earlier  Brookings  Panel meeting. In 
that  paper, Dornbusch  appeared  to advance  the general  hypothesis  that 
moderate  inflation is good for developing countries, even if it is epi- 
sodic, because it arises from occasional currency  crises. In the current 
paper, the focus appears  to be on the role of real shocks in bringing 
about  currency  crises. He noted that the present  paper  appears  to look 
at instances of nominal devaluation  as government  attempts  to correct 
real overvaluations  where disinflation is too painful a means of cor- 
recting the real exchange rate. This reasoning seems to accept the 
presence of inflation illusion that permits devaluation  to achieve real 
depreciation  without appreciable  real costs. The paper  seems to advo- 
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omy has experienced a real shock. Finland's devaluation is seen as 
appropriate  because Finland had experienced a real shock requiring  a 
real depreciation. Phelps had expected the paper to provide a post- 
mortem  on the Mexican currency  crisis arguing  that, as awful as the 
devaluation  of the peso was, disinflation  would have been worse. But 
he found no econometric evidence or other empirical support  for this 
idea in the paper. 
Responding  to Phelps, Dornbusch  could not recall having said that 
inflation is generally good for developing countries, although he did 
think that, in many instances, getting from, for example, 7 percent 
inflation to 0 percent might not be worth the real cost in output and 
employment. He regarded  the main motivation  of the present  paper  as 
trying  to explain the sudden  onset of the Mexican  currency  crisis when 
it had been clear for a substantial  length of time before the crisis that 
the peg of the nominal  exchange rate was unrealistic,  given the appre- 
ciation of the real exchange rate. Why did financial  markets  not antic- 
ipate the event when the facts were readily available in newspapers 
every day, and why did the government  not act sooner to prevent  the 
inevitable  collapse? 
He explained that the paper  presents  the Mexican currency  crisis as 
part  of a process whereby  the government  realizes that  a fixed exchange 
rate is becoming less and less credible but reacts by committing  itself 
ever more deeply to that policy. Then, in a setting of liberalized  finan- 
cial markets  and a globally integrated  capital market,  the government 
borrows  more, thereby  buying  more  time and  postponing  the inevitable. 
When the collapse finally comes, usually precipitated  by some minor 
event, it is of a very different  nature  from the old-fashioned  pattern  of 
spending  a bit too much, becoming overvalued, having a devaluation, 
and then repeating  the process four years later. Because governments 
can now support  an unrealistic  exchange rate for a prolonged  period, 
adding to the potential capital outflow and eventual imbalance, when 
the crisis comes, it is much more severe. 
Dornbusch  added  that for Mexico, devaluation  was a preferred  rem- 
edy to deflation  because deflation  would have imposed  even higher  real 
costs. He could not imagine the political system tolerating  even higher 
real interest rates (which would have put even more of the financial 
system  out of business) alongside  restrictive  fiscal policies, and  without 
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growth.  He noted  that  Argentina  is in a different  situation  than  Mexico. 
The establishment  of a currency  board  in Argentina  means that deval- 
uation is not a plausible strategy. The best policy option is for the 
government  to retain the fixed exchange rate and wait for deflation  to 
bring the real exchange rate back down because, unlike in the case of 
Mexico, there is no exchange rate illusion. The danger  inherent  in this 
policy is that  because deflation  is a slow process, the real exchange  rate 
adjustment  may take a long time. 
James Duesenberry  noted that in a framework  where the real ex- 
change rate is considered a policy variable, the government  must im- 
plement  policies that prevent  a wage-price spiral  from eliminating  any 
gains in competitiveness that a devaluation  of the nominal exchange 
rate might bring. In this context, he emphasized  the role of fiscal and 
monetary  policies in controlling the effects of a nominal devaluation 
on demand, and argued that many countries fail to realize gains in 
competitiveness following nominal devaluations because appropriate 
policies are not implemented.  Duesenberry  also considered  the circum- 
stances in which fixing the nominal  exchange rate might be beneficial. 
He argued that reducing excessive volatility was the main benefit of 
fixing  the exchange  rate, but  warned  that  a country  should  avoid  making 
an irrevocable  commitment  to a fixed rate. One danger  was the possi- 
bility of initial overvaluation;  another  was excessive reliance on the 
fixed rate as a tool for fighting  inflation.  Duesenberry  also emphasized 
the important  role of reserves, borrowing  power, and capital controls 
in determining  whether  fixing an exchange rate is a feasible strategy. 
He noted that  in many African  countries  there  are no reserves, borrow- 
ing power was used up long ago, and capital controls cannot be used 
as an effective policy tool. 
Christopher  Sims commented  on the extensive list of countries  that 
had experienced episodes of real exchange rate appreciation.  These 
episodes all seem to have ended with the real exchange rate returning 
to pre-appreciation  levels. If this is a robust  finding, the real exchange 
rate  would be one of the few economic time series that  is not a random 
walk but rather,  a series that  returns  to a mean  or a very slowly moving 
trend. However, Sims noted that the criteria for measuring  the real 
exchange  rate movements-such  as what peaks and troughs  were cho- 
sen-were  unclear. He wondered  whether  the reversal  result  depended 
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chosen for analysis. Referring  to Sims' comments, Sebastian  Edwards 
reported  on his own effort to look systematically at eighty-seven de- 
valuations  during  the period 1954 to 1984, where a 10 percent  fall in 
the nominal exchange rate from a fixed rate regime was considered  a 
devaluation.  In general the real exchange rates did tend to revert, but 
only very gradually, so that the series was close to a random  walk by 
conventional  statistical  criteria. 
Goldfajn amended Edwards' conclusion that the Chilean and the 
recent Mexican currency crises are unique cases,  in that neither in- 
volved fiscal mismanagement,  by arguing that the Finnish currency 
crisis ought  to be included  in that  group. On Brazil, he noted  that  fixing 
the nominal exchange rate has been successful in reducing inflation 
from 45 percent  per month to 25 percent  per year, and concluded  that 
a nominal  exchange rate peg can be an important  policy instrument  in 
reducing  inflation, even though a peg cannot last forever. Rudiger  Dornbusch, Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valde's  289 
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